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5 
Issues and Recommendations 
Due Diligence in Cyberspace 
Guidelines for International and European Cyber 
Policy and Cybersecurity Policy 
Global cyberspace is undergoing fundamental change. 
There are now frequent references to a “fragmentation 
of the Internet”, but many European and international 
working groups are also increasingly aware that “a free, 
open and at the same time secure Internet” is a global 
public good. To create and preserve the Internet as a 
public good, concerted global action is needed on the 
basis of a common norm, which makes states mutu-
ally responsible for their diligence in national regula-
tory processes. This norm is implicitly incorporated in 
the German cybersecurity strategy of 2011 as well as 
the EU’s 2013 cybersecurity strategy, which provides 
for civil, police and military-defensive approaches to 
protecting information-technology (IT) systems and 
infrastructure. 
In the course of the discussion about a new German 
cybersecurity strategy to be adopted in late autumn 
of this year, a growing number of political voices have 
also argued that political regulation and digital sover-
eignty should be strengthened and renationalised. Poli-
tics must face up to the reality of the military becom-
ing increasingly operative in cyberspace. This will be 
reflected in the German Federal Government’s new 
White Paper as well as in NATO’s and the EU’s future 
cyberdefence. In other words, it will be implemented 
in the German and European security policy as well as 
in their defence missions and military procurement. 
Liberal democracies need to be aware that the idea 
of a free and open Internet can only be realized if 
there is consensus among a “coalition of liberal states” 
not only on how the Internet should be governend but 
why International and transatlantic cooperation is 
meaningful. German and European policy should go 
ahead and orientate itself on the norm of due dili-
gence in cyberspace – and do so in an interministerial 
way – so as to enforce it internationally. Due diligence 
in cyberspace builds on the international legal stand-
ard of due diligence, which stipulates that a state 
must do everything necessary to prevent actions ema-
nating from within its own territory that might in-
fringe the rights of third parties. In the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
for instance, there is far-reaching consensus on due 
diligence, which would be an obvious choice for the 
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6 
normative basis for a global cyber order. The political 
rules adopted for an international cyber policy and 
cybersecurity policy will always lag behind techno-
logical developments. It is the more important, there-
fore, that new regulations be subordinated to an over-
arching norm. Three crucial political requirements 
arise from this: 
 European cooperation: integrating national policies 
into the European framework; 
 Inclusiveness: giving different interest groups broad 
and publicly accessible representation in formulat-
ing policies; 
 Civilian response: prioritising the civilian com-
ponent over the military component, particularly 
in times of peace. 
 
European cooperation. Due diligence demands that states 
behave responsibly not only towards one another, but 
also in internal and home affairs regulatory practices. 
The EU’s 2013 cybersecurity strategy already provided 
for this. As part of implementing the EU directive on 
network and information security (NIS), all EU states 
must introduce minimum standards and reporting 
requirements for IT security, and operators of critical 
infrastructure must be involved in fighting cyber-
crime. To establish the digital single market, national 
regulations in civil law (data protection), commercial 
law (Internet Governance) and competition law (do-
mestic market) must be worded in such a way as to ful-
fil due diligence obligations. To accelerate this process, 
it will be advisable quickly to pass the EU’s planned 
Global Strategy for cyberspace. NATO and EU members 
largely agree that states are responsible for their own 
behaviour in cyberspace. There is close consultation 
among Europe’s “Big Three” on all of these issues, as 
well as with the group of likeminded western states. 
European and western states represented in the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN 
GGE) should use the upcoming fifth round of UN GGE 
negotiatons to campaign for the fight against cyber-
crime, by adapting their substantive criminal law. The 
minimum conditions for global cybersecurity are 
ratifying the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime as 
well as continuous confidence- and security-building 
measures (CSBM) in the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Inclusiveness. The UN summit in December 2015, 
which was part of the WSIS (World Summit on the 
Information Society) follow-up process, showed that a 
worldwide agreement on a binding interpretation of 
due diligence is unlikely in the short term. Therefore, 
the decision taken in December 2015 to continue the 
Internet Governance Forum – in other words, to keep 
pursuing the multi-stakeholder approach – still offers 
the best chance of preventing the idea of a global free 
and open Internet from falling victim to governments’ 
intensifying security considerations. In Internet Gov-
ernance, it is therefore crucial to support the multi-
stakeholder approach (interpreted inclusively) and to 
reject the principle of intergovernmental decision-
making. The experience of the WSIS process of the past 
ten years has clearly shown the ineffectiveness of inter-
governmental decision-making. In addition, it would 
be important to make the norm of due diligence bind-
ing on all stakeholders: private users, access-network 
operators and operators of transmission networks 
and Internet exchanges. In the long term, arbitration 
authorities ought to ensure that due diligence is prop-
erly implemented. 
Civilian response. Initiatives such as a national strate-
gy to protect the economy and industry against espio-
nage back strengthened defensive intelligence capa-
bilities. However, the German Ministry of Defense 
indicates that it wants to build additional defensive 
capabilities for reacting to cyber attacks. It would not 
be advisable for the government to evolve towards 
an offensive cyberdefence. That would not only be in 
open contradiction with the idea of due diligence 
in cyberdiplomacy, but it would also bring with it the 
risk of conflict escalation and a proliferation of cyber 
attacks. It is common sense that cyber attacks are diffi-
cult to attribute and retaliatory attacks can cause 
serious unintended damage. The June 2015 attack on 
the German Federal Parliament showed how vital it is 
to persist in developing resilient structures. Declaring 
a given act a violation of sovereignty; having recourse 
to NATO solidarity; or declaring cyberwar against 
Islamic State, as the US did, must be seen as the last 
resorts of politics. Further resources are necessary to 
prop up a strategy based on resilience: for high-secu-
rity technology, for developing digital forensics, and 
for extensive further-training measures to heighten 
awareness among civil servants, scientists, academics 
and researchers. Confidence-building measures within 
the OSCE, capacity-building in third countries under 
the leadership of the EU and the GGE must be inten-
sified. This is the only realistic basis for achieving 
bilateral agreements that improve cooperation in solv-
ing and prosecuting cross-border digital crimes and 
remove so-called ”safe havens”. A recent example of 
this is the accord between the US and China on fight-
ing cybercrime. 
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7 
Due Diligence as a Guiding Principle 
 
“Cybersecurity due diligence has been defined as 
the review of the governance, processes and con-
trols that are used to secure information assets. Or 
more simply, due diligence refers to your activities 
to identify and understand the risks facing your 
organization. Such due diligence obligations may 
exist between states, between non-state actors (e.g., 
private corporations), and between state and non-
state actors. Here the term is used to refer to the in-
ternational obligations of both state and non-state 
actors to help identify and instil cybersecurity best 
practices so as to promote the security of critical 
ICT infrastructure.”1 
European and German cyberdiplomacy aim to “pro-
tect and further an open, free and secure global 
Internet as a space for diversity of opinions, participa-
tion, innovation and engine for economic growth and 
work”.2 This can also be described as a global public 
good, whose provision requires the cooperation of 
all important states, businesses, academics and civil 
society.3 It will only be possible to prevent regional 
fragmentation, the threat of crime and a militarisa-
tion of cyberspace4 if the community of states – 
 
1  Scott J. Shackelford, talk given to the CyberLab of the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (Brussels, November 2015). 
2  German Federal Government, Europäische und internationale 
Dimension der Digitalen Agenda, http://www.digitale-agenda.de/ 
Webs/DA/DE/Handlungsfelder/7_Dimension/dimension_node. 
html (accessed 30 November 2015). 
3  Important suggestions for this pilot study came from working-
group results from two events: the SWP’s CyberLabs with about 
60 participants, held in the offices of the Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik in Berlin (8 September 2015), and the Permanent 
Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Euro-
pean Union in Brussels (18 November 2015). I am particularly 
grateful to Prof. Christopher Daase (Goethe University, Frank-
furt/Main) as well as to Prof. Scott Shackelford (Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington, USA) and to all participants from the execu-
tive and legislative branches and other stakeholders for their 
constructive collaboration.  
4  The German Federal Government’s cybersecurity strategy 
states: “Cyberspace is the virtual space of all IT systems net-
worked at the data level on a global scale. Cyberspace is based 
on the universal and publicly accessible connection and trans-
port network of the Internet, which can be complemented and 
expanded at will by other data networks. IT systems functioning 
including all Internet stakeholders5 – agrees on com-
mon norms of conduct and accepts rules that make 
these norms binding. Cybersecurity, in other words, 
is the “state of IT security to strive for, at which the 
risks of global cyberspace are reduced to an acceptable 
level”.6 
The German federal government, EU member states 
and the EU itself adhere on principle to the idea of 
“due diligence”7 in implementing their cybersecurity 
strategies.8 This norm commits states to ensuring that 
no actions originating on their territory in times of 
peace violate the rights of other states.9 In its cyber-
security strategy, the German Federal Government 
foregrounded the preventative and reactive protection 
of IT systems and infrastructures as well as civilian, 
police and military-defensive approaches. Further-
 
in an isolated virtual space are not part of cyberspace.” Ger-
man Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie 
für Deutschland (Berlin, 2011), 14, http://www.bmi.bund.de/ 
SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/ 
Informationsgesellschaft/cyber.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
5  “The Internet is a worldwide web of publicly accessible net-
works. These networks are operated independently of each 
other, but use a joint address space and standardised joint 
‘languages’, so-called transmission protocols, to ensure mutual 
accessibility. The Internet Protocol (IP) in particular has a crucial 
role. The internet makes it possible to transport data at will.” 
Jens Tiemann and Gabriele Goldacker, Vernetzung als Infrastruktur 
– Ein Internet-Modell (Berlin: Kompetenzzentrum Öffentliche 
Informationstechnologie [ÖFIT], October 2015), 10, http://www. 
oeffentliche-it.de/documents/10181/14412/Vernetzung+als+ 
Infrastruktur+-+Ein+Internet-Modell (accessed 5 February 2016). 
6  German Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicherheits-
strategie für Deutschland (see note 4), 15; Hans-Jürgen Lange and 
Astrid Bötticher, eds., Cyber-Sicherheit (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 
2015). 
7  The principle of due diligence derives from a verdict of the 
International Court: International Court of Justice, United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania, The Corfu Channel 
Case (Merits), Judgment of April 9th, 1949, 4–38. 
8  For the application of this concept to cybersecurity, see Scott 
Shackelford, Scott Russell and Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the 
International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons From the Public 
and Private Sectors, Kelley School of Business Research Paper 
no. 15–64 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 27 August 2015). 
9  Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013); German Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicher-
heitsstrategie für Deutschland (see note 4), 12. 
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more, the International Court has elaborated in a 
decision “that the obligation of prevention is a due 
diligence obligation”.10 Due diligence enables the in-
ternational community to use international law “to 
hold states to account for omissions in making their 
infrastructure safe; for breaching their obligations by 
neglecting to take action; or for a lack of cooperation 
in protecting against and solving cyber attacks”.11 
In 2000, the UN General Assembly called on states 
„[to] ensure that their laws and practice eliminate safe 
havens for those who criminally misuse information 
technologies“.12 The UN Group of Governmental Ex-
perts (GGE), in which Germany is represented, picked 
up this idea in its final report of June 2015. According 
to the report, all states shall ensure that their terri-
tories, and especially the computersystems and infra-
structure situated there or otherwise under the states’ 
control, is not misused for attacks on the infrastruc-
ture of other states.13 
Due diligence is usually translated in international 
law treaties by the rather problematic term “Sorgfalts-
pflicht”.14 However, this term only refers to restrictions 
on one’s own conduct. It is therefore more meaningful 
to use “Sorgfaltsverantwortung” for due diligence. The 
principle of due diligence derives its particular norma-
tive force from the idea that states are not only respon-
sible for keeping law and order on their own territories, 
but also bear responsibility for the external consequences of 
 
10  International Court of Justice, “Case Concerning Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 
2010”, ICJ Reports 79 (2010): 14–107. [Paragraph 197]: “the obliga-
tion [...] to prevent [...] is an obligation to act with due diligence 
in respect of all activities which take place under the juris-
diction and control of each party”. 
11  Christian Schaller, Internationale Sicherheit und Völkerrecht im 
Cyberspace, SWP-Studie 18/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, October 2014), 25. Article 28ff of the draft articles of the 
United Nations International Law Commission on the respon-
sibility of states: International Law Commission, “Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, vol. II, part 2 (New York and Geneva, 
2001): 26–143; also published as an annex to United Nations 
General Assembly, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Resolution 56/83 (New York, 12 December 2001). 
12  United Nations General Assembly, Combating the Criminal 
Misuse of Information Technologies, Resolution 55/63 (New York, 
4 December 2000), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/ 
docs/UN_resolution_55_63.pdf (accessed 30 November 2015). 
13  United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Gov-
ernmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/70/174 
(New York, June 2015). 
14  For the international law of the Web, see Schaller, Inter-
nationale Sicherheit und Völkerrecht im Cyberspace (see note 11). 
internal regulations. Decisions taken by individual states 
increasingly have an impact beyond their national ter-
ritory. That is why states must exercise care with such 
decisions and be accountable to one another for them. 
As far as cyberspace is concerned, states may not simply 
limit themselves to taking no irresponsible decisions. 
This study further assumes that safeguarding the Inter-
net needs to the political will by all stakeholders for 
international cooperation.15 Accordingly, states in 
cooperation with other states are obliged to do every-
thing that may be reasonably expected of them to 
help deliver an “open, free and secure Internet”. 
This expectation encompasses decision-making 
processes that meet high standards. This means that 
available competences should be integrated as far as 
possible, and that one-sided interest-driven politics 
should be avoided.16 In other words, an international 
cyber policy and cybersecurity policy defined by due 
diligence necessarily also comprises the specific mode 
of regulation. Germany’s international cyber policy 
and cybersecurity policy thus needs to be coordinated 
at the European level, militarily reticent, and integrated 
into inclusive and transparent regulatory processes.17 
 Due diligence18 comprises regulatory processes 
with a high level of representativity and inclusive-
ness as well as transparency. As Christopher Daase 
pointed out: “In democracies, in the long term, no 
policy can be pushed through against the will of 
the majority and not even against the resistance of 
 
15  The collaboration of IT emergency teams (Computer Emer-
gency Response Team, CERT) in the CyberGreen project (www. 
cybergreen.net) could serve as a model. Here, CERTs from the 
Pacific Region states as well as Japan and China work together to 
ensure a “green cyberspace”.They perceive themselves as strictly 
technical, but the project is nevertheless based on the idea of 
jointly identifying and rectifying weak areas, such as malware 
or vulnerable networks. 
16  An example is the debate about communications encryption 
and the divergent positions of the security agencies on the one 
hand and industry representatives on the other hand. On this 
point, see also Berklett Cybersecurity Project, ed., Don’t Panic: 
Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate (Cambridge, MA: Berk-
man Center for Internet and Society at Harvard, February 2016). 
17  These vital requirements derive from the results of the 2015 
SWP CyberLabs (see note 3). 
18  On the concept of responsibility in international relations, 
see the results of the conference on “Politik und Verantwortung” 
(Frankfurt/Main, 10–12 February 2016), to be published in 2017 
in a special issue of the Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS). See also 
Christopher Daase and Julian Junk, eds., Internationale Schutz-
verantwortung – Normative Erwartungen und politische Praxis, Sonder-
heft der Friedens-Warte 88, no. 1–2 (2013); Hanns W. Maull, “What 
German Responsibility Means”, Security and Human Rights 26, 
no. 1 (2015): 11–24. 
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substantial parts of the minority. Especially in 
times of crisis, the so-called rallying effect is an 
indispensable element of democratic resilience.”19 
However, the inclusiveness of legislative processes 
should stop wherever private-sector actors start 
exerting a dominant influence on legislative bod-
ies.20 This can only be countered with transparent 
and representative processes that also give other 
states a minimum of certainty that their legitimate 
interests are being taken into consideration. The 
openness of a political system is, in turn, a funda-
mental prerequisite for states trusting one another 
so that they can deliver their individual contribu-
tions to producing the public good of a “secure 
cyberspace”. These requirements are far from easy 
to meet. In a technically challenging area such as 
international cyber policy and cybersecurity policy, 
consultations often need to be confidential. Fur-
thermore, the expertise of large companies almost 
inevitably dominates this field, making it extraor-
dinarily difficult for civil-society representatives or 
members of parliament to be accepted as compe-
tent interlocutors. Special efforts are therefore 
required to prevent one-sided representations of 
interests or the instrumentalisation of policy by the 
industry.21 
A maxim of Germany’s self-perception in foreign 
policy states that regulatory practices should be co-
ordinated as closely as possible with its most impor-
tant European partners.22 The internal market is so 
tightly interconnected through digital technologies – 
as indeed are its foreign and security policies – that 
individual member states’ policies in cyberspace are 
 
19  Christopher Daase, “Innenpolitische Voraussetzungen erfolg-
reicher Cyber-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, lecture given at 
the CyberLab of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) 
(Berlin, 8 September 2015). A “rallying-effect” is a short-term but 
far-reaching and broad public agreement with or toleration of 
exceptional measures, especially in times of crisis. 
20  For example, lobbying by the industry during the drafting 
of the new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) culmi-
nated in entire passages of text from trade-association position 
papers being reproduced in the amendments to the legislative 
act. Patrick Beuth, “Bundesregierung hofiert Lobbyisten”, Zeit 
Online, 10 March 2015, http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/ 
2015-03/eu-datenschutzgrundverordnung-ministerrat-
bundesregierung-lobbyplag (accessed 30 November 2015). 
21  Liz Alderman, “Terror Threats Thaw Budgets across Europe”, 
New York Times, 31 January 2016. 
22  Recommended reading on Germany’s self-perception in 
foreign policy is Gunther Hellmann, “Germany’s World: Power 
and Followership in a Crisis-Ridden Europa”, Global Affairs 2, no. 1 
(2016): 3–20. 
ineffective in comparison to a regional European 
approach. 
 Through its international cyber policy, Germany 
intends to achieve effective collaboration on cyber-
security in Europe and across the world. German 
measures to promote a free and secure Internet 
should therefore always be integrated at the Euro-
pean or transatlantic level. No state can seriously 
claim to be able to regulate cyberspace on its own. 
Germany will only be able to gain sufficient nego-
tiating power on the global stage if it coordinates 
intensively with the leading European cybernations 
(France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, 
Spain and Poland) and if it uses EU structures such 
as the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber 
Issues (FoP Cyber).23 Only regulatory processes co-
ordinated at the European level can prevent global-
isation and digitalisation from aggravating the 
symptoms of the crisis in European integration. 
For historical reasons, it is self-evident for Germany 
that the militarisation and securitisation of cyber-
space24 must be counteracted. Due diligence also signi-
fies that states should not merely orientate themselves 
along national interests, but also think in the catego-
ries of global public good. Germany’s tradition of 
civilian power25 is perpetuated in its international 
cyber policy and cybersecurity policy as well. 
 The German Federal Republic has always held to 
the principle of generally pursuing its interests 
through economic and political rather than mili-
tary means. In view of this tradition, the only 
responsible international cyber policy and cyber-
security policy is one that tries to civilise inter-
national policy in cyberspace. That would mean 
internationalising socially accepted norms as much 
as possible – for example in the GGE, OSCE and 
 
23  The FoP Cyber was created in 2013 for a three-year period as 
a permanent body to monitor the implementation of Europe’s 
cyberstrategy. The group has evolved into the most important EU 
forum for discussing and following up on all cybertopics. 
24  On this point, see inter alia Ronald J. Deibert, Black Code: Inside 
the Battle for Cyberspace (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013); 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cybersecurity and Threat Politics: US Efforts 
to Secure the Information Age (London: Routledge, 2008); Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty, “Cybersecurity and the Negative Consequences of 
State Action”, paper given at the conference “The Future of Inter-
national Order”, at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 
29 November – 1 December 2015. 
25  Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, “Zivilmacht und Rollen-
theorie”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3, no. 2 (1996): 
283–312; Maull, “What German Responsibility Means” (see 
note 18). 
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other governmental organisations and fora – and 
thereby repressing the violent assertion of regula-
tions. Military violence – including an active cyber-
defence26 based on deterrence – could only be jus-
tified at the national level in cases of self-defence 
and where it was coordinated with the EU and Nato 
member states on the one hand and was decided by 
the German Parliament. Responding to cyber attacks 
with automatic counterattacks and digital acts of 
reprisal would be extremely problematic. For one 
thing, any attempt to attribute cyber attacks un-
equivocally raises all sorts of technical, legal and 
political questions; for another, counterattacks can 
have serious side-effects. Active cyberdefence might 
provoke a digital arms race – for instance through 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs27) – with incalcu-
lable risks for fragile critical infrastructure. From a 
due diligence perspective, a strategy of “deterrence-
by-resilience”28 is therefore preferable. With their 
new IT-security law and the NIS (Network and Infor-
mation Security) directive, Germany and the EU 
are leading by example in creating resilient infor-
mation and communications structures in critical 
infrastructure and in setting minimum standards 
in IT security. Research into resilience, prevention, 
peace and conflict has a key role to play in cyber-
security when it comes to civilising politics. 
In due diligence, material and procedural contents 
merge into an overarching norm. For the purposes of 
 
26  Offensive strategies aim at “attacking the systems of other 
states, sabotaging them, gaining control over them, rendering 
them inoperative or causing malfunctioning”. But it is a matter 
of “securing and sustaining one’s own IT structures and com-
munications and weapons systems, and protecting them against 
being influenced or attacked, by using so-called defensive 
approaches.” German Parliament, Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten 
Dr. Alexander Neu u.a.: Krieg im “Cyber-Raum” – offensive und defensive 
Cyberstrategie des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung, Drucksache 
18/6496 (Berlin, 16 October 2015). On this classification, see also 
Robert S. Dewar, The “Triptych of Cybersecurity”: A Classification of 
Active Cyber Defence, contribution to the 6th International Con-
ference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, 3–6 June 2014. 
27  APTs occur in waves. After infiltrating a system, the malware 
remains hidden and accesses data in stages. Without effective 
protective tools, it can take weeks or even months just to dis-
cover the security breaches and attacks. See German Federal 
Office for Information Security, Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutsch-
land 2015 (Bonn, November 2015), 26f. 
28  Michael Rühle, “Das Prinzip Abschreckung”, Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 31 March 2015. See also Annegret Bendiek and 
Tobias Metzger, Deterrence Theory in the Cyber-Century, Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2015 (SWP EU/Europe 
Division Working Paper 2/2015). 
due diligence, cybersecurity also comprises a certain 
form of political regulation. This is about “resist[ing] 
the securitisation of the Internet and of Internet 
policy. The goal should not so much be security in 
abstracto as resilience, meaning the ability to with-
stand shocks. And that can only be achieved through 
complex structures involving the whole of society”.29 
An international cyber policy and cybersecurity policy 
is based on a broad understanding of security and 
involves all stakeholders such as the state, academia, 
industry and society.30 
 
 
29  Daase, “Innenpolitische Voraussetzungen erfolgreicher 
Cyber-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik” (see note 19). 
30  The multi-stakeholder model was laid down as the foundation 
for Internet Governance at the World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society (WSIS II) in Tunis in 2005. During the UN Summit 
held in December 2015 as part of the WSIS follow-up process, 
there was disagreement on how this model, which has been suc-
cessfully used in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
might be developed further. 
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Due Diligence in Institutional Practice 
 
German policies are already beginning to take due 
diligence into account to some extent, but the norm is 
not yet sufficiently embedded in German institutions. 
From this perspective, the coherence and the consist-
ency of content of Germany’s international cyber policy 
and cybersecurity policy must be closely scrutinised. 
Its current institutional structure reflects the fact that 
the implementation of due diligence has already come 
a long way. The responsible authorities are now closely 
interconnected. However, it is also clear that much 
still needs to be improved with a view to European 
cooperation, inclusiveness and civilian response. 
Institutional Structures 
The German Federal Government has committed to 
creating a complete instrumentarium in coordination 
with the responsible state authorities to defend against 
cyber attacks.31 This is intended to contribute to guar-
anteeing security provisions for the state as a whole. 
The development of fully differentiated responsibili-
ties is politically willed.32 Germany’s international 
cyber policy and cybersecurity policy contains a whole 
series of cooperations, which essentially rest on five 
pillars. 
First Pillar: The Federal Office for Information Security 
In Germany, overall ministerial control over cyber-
security issues rests with the German Federal Ministry 
of the Interior (BMI).33 The Federal Office for Informa-
tion Security (BSI) is the Federal Government’s most 
important service provider in IT security. It reports 
to the BMI. The BSI is also responsible for operations 
to repel attacks against the Federal Government’s IT 
 
31  German Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicherheits-
strategie für Deutschland (see note 4). 
32  In Norway, for instance, the national cybersecurity strategy 
is part of the portfolio of the ministry of justice. The Norwegian 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs is currently elaborating a Global 
Strategy for Cyberspace. 
33  German Federal Ministry of Defence, Weißbuch 2016, http:// 
www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8x 
Bz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5Az9gmxHRQBg2ftX/ 
(accessed 30 November 2015). 
infrastructure. It has an IT emergency team (CERT-
Bund) at its disposal for this. The Federal Office fulfils 
its mission as “the central reporting office for security 
in Federal-Government IT”, in charge of “repelling 
harmful programmes and threats to the Federal Gov-
ernment’s communications technology”, “stipulating 
guidelines on security standards” and providing cer-
tifications.34 Because of the high quality of the BSI 
standard (ISO 27001) for promoting certified basic func-
tions, and because of other recommendations, the 
BSI enjoys a high level of European and international 
recognition. For years, it has been involved in an in-
tensive international exchange of experience and in-
formation at the management and professional levels. 
At the operations level, cooperation with other IT 
emergency teams is especially important. CERT-Bund 
belongs to the interdisciplinary International Watch 
and Warning Network (IWWN).35 At the domestic 
level, the BSI initiated the founding of the Allianz für 
Cybersicherheit (alliance for cybersecurity), which 
now pools German know-how on cybersecurity and 
has become the main point of contact for companies 
and citizens.36 The Federal Office of Bundeswehr 
Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service 
Support (BAAINBw) and the IT emergency team of the 
German armed forces (CERTBw) work closely with 
the BSI, in particular with its IT situation and analysis 
centre and the CERT-Bund team. 
Second Pillar: The National Cyberdefence Centre 
A vital step towards implementing due diligence was 
taken in 2011 with the creation of the National Cyber-
defence Centre.37 This information platform is intended 
 
34  German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 
ed., Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(BSI-Gesetz – BSIG), last modified on 17 July 2015, http://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/bsig_2009/BJNR282110009.html (accessed 
30 November 2015). 
35  IT Law Wiki, International Watch and Warning Network, http:// 
itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/International_Watch_and Warning_ 
Network (accessed 30 November 2015). 
36  German Federal Office for Information Security, Allianz für 
Cyber-Sicherheit, http://www.allianz-fuer-cybersicherheit.de/ACS/ 
DE/Home/startseite.html (accessed 30 November 2015). 
37  The Centre groups together representatives of the BSI, Ger-
man Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance 
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to simplify cooperation between the various govern-
ment agencies and improve measures to protect against 
and repel IT attacks. The Centre is also part of the 
state’s project-based collaboration with companies 
and service providers, and with foreign security ser-
vices. The separation rule is a fundamental tenet of 
German federal legislation and stipulates that the 
tasks of the police and the intelligence services must 
be carried out by different, organisationally distinct 
authorities. Counter-intelligence is the purview of the 
BfV while the BKA is responsible for policing criminally 
motivated IT attacks. The technical information depart-
ment (TA) of the Federal Intelligence Services (BND) 
retrieves information by technical means (Signals In-
telligence or SIGINT); it obtains, in accordance with 
its official mandate, information that is significant for 
Germany’s foreign and security policy; and it evalu-
ates it.38 Using this information, the BND also sup-
ports the German armed forces in their cyberdefence. 
Third Pillar: The National Cybersecurity Council 
When dealing with the challenges of cybersecurity, 
strong coordination with the state as a whole must be 
ensured.39 To this end, the interministerial National 
Cybersecurity Council, chaired by the Federal Com-
missioner for Information Technology, brings together 
the secretaries of state.40 Furthermore, in Germany, IT 
security is a federal issue. The Cybersecurity Council 
consists of two federal-state representatives, repre-
 
(BBK), domestic intelligence service (BfV), German Intelligence 
Services (BND), Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Customs 
Investigation Bureau (ZKA), Federal Police (BPol) and Armed 
Forces. Federal Ministry of the Interior, Nationales Cyber-Abwehr-
zentrum, http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/IT-
Cybersicherheit/Cyberabwehrzentrum/cyberabwehrzentrum_ 
node.html (accessed 22 February 2016). 
38  According to media reports, in 2014 the Federal Parliament’s 
budget committee made 300 million euros available to the BND 
for implementing the so-called Strategic Technology Initiative 
(SIT), a technological modernisation programme.This total, to 
be paid in yearly tranches until 2020, is intended to expand the 
technical capabilities of the BND. John Goetz and Hans Leyen-
decker, “Aufrüsten für den Cyberkampf”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
10 November 2014, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/ 
bundesnachrichtendienst-aufruesten-fuer-den-cyberkampf-
1.2211761 (accessed 5 February 2016). 
39  Carsten Köppl, IT-Sicherheit föderalisiert sich, summary of the 
“Public IT-Security” (PITS) conference (Berlin, 25/26 September 
2013), http://www.public-it-security.de/icc/public/nav/e86/ 
e862fd19-3c66-6413-ccca-2a307b988f2e.htm. 
40  German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber-Sicherheitsrat, 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/IT-Cybersicherheit/ 
Cybersicherheitsrat/cybersicherheitsrat_node.html (accessed 
22 February 2016). 
sentatives of several federal authorities – the BKA; the 
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AA); the Federal 
Ministries of the Interior; of Education and Research; 
of Defence (BMVg); for Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi); of Justice and Consumer Protection; and of 
Finance – as well as four associated bodies represent-
ing the industry (the Federation for the Information 
Economy, Telecommunications and New Media; the 
Federation of German Industries; the Association of 
German Chambers of Commerce and Industry; and 
the transmission system operator Amprion GmbH). 
Since 2013, the Cybersecurity Council has been meet-
ing three times a year. Fundamental issues of federal 
IT management and security are also dealt with in 
the interministerial council of IT commissioners (also 
called the IT Council). 
Fourth Pillar: An International Cyber Policy 
Germany’s 2011 cybersecurity strategy stipulates 
the development of a targeted and coordinated inter-
national cyber policy that makes it possible to take 
preventative measures for IT security in Germany, 
particularly to protect critical infrastructure and for 
international cooperation.41 This international cyber 
policy includes a representation of German interests 
with the EU and other international organisations and 
bodies, and in bilateral dialogues. In 2011, the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs created its coordination staff for 
international cyber policy.42 This staff serves as the 
interface between national ministerial policies on the 
one hand and the effort to coordinate the internation-
al exertion of influence on the other hand, with the 
aim of creating a climate of security and trust, such as 
is indispensable for a defensive cybersecurity strategy. 
Fifth Pillar: The German Armed Forces 
Measures taken by the German military should be lim-
ited to protecting their own capacity to act in accord-
ance with their mandate, “so as to embed cybersecurity 
as a part of the security provisions for the state as a 
whole”.43 This is the responsibility of the German mili-
 
41  Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie 
für Deutschland (see note 4). 
42  Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyber-Außenpolitik, http:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/ 
Cyber-Aussenpolitik/KS_Cyber-Aussenpolitik_node.html (ac-
cessed 5 February 2016). 
43  Federal Ministry of the Interior, ed., Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie 
für Deutschland (see note 4). 
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tary’s CNO forces,44 which are to be expanded further 
and to be used for active cyberdefence in future.45 This 
seems to indicate a potential paradigm change from 
defensive to offensive cyberprotection. In September 
2015, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen 
confirmed that “a new goal is being developed for 
cyberspace and IT, both downstream and in the minis-
try”.46 The creation of a pool of IT reservists is planned 
for specific military cyber operations. There are also 
plans for giving Military Counter-Intelligence (MAD) 
an expanded counter-intelligence mission for deploy-
ment abroad, to cover all persons who might pose 
a risk to the armed forces’ security or readiness for 
duty.47 Acording to Colonel Joachim Smola, perma-
nent representative of the MAD president, the MAD is 
“much more [...] than a purely defensive intelligence 
service”, but rather a “comprehensive service provider 
on security issues, and it advises and supports the 
German armed forces [...] both at their garrisons and 
on foreign deployment”.48 
At the parliamentary level, currently three main 
bodies control fundamental areas of the cybersecurity 
strategy that concerns the Federal Government’s intel-
ligence activities: the parliamentary oversight com-
mittee (PKGr), G-10 Committee and the NSA commit-
tee of inquiry. The panels of experts – the digital-
agenda committee, interior committee, foreign com-
mittee, defence committee – handle further topics 
of the international cybersecurity policy. Cyberspace 
makes no distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy. Parliament, in its work to uphold democracy 
and the rule of law, must take this insight into account 
 
44  Computer Network Operations (CNO) are non-kinetic means 
of attack, which work by implementing computer codes or com-
puter programmes in cyberspace. They serve to manipulate, 
disrupt or even destroy enemy information and communications 
systems as well as protect states’ own systems or gather infor-
mation from data sources that are not publicly available. CNOs 
are therefore subdivided into Computer Network Attacks (CNA), 
Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network 
Exploitation (CNE). 
45  Federal Ministry of Defence, “Tagesbefehl der Ministerin: 
Bundeswehr wird im Cyber-Raum zukunftsfähig” (Berlin, 17 Sep-
tember 2015). 
46  Ibid. 
47  Andre Meister, “Geheime Cyber-Leitlinie: Verteidigungsminis-
terium erlaubt Bundeswehr ‘Cyberwar’ und offensive digitale 
Angriffe”, netzpolitik.org, 30 July 2015, https://netzpolitik.org/ 
2015/geheime-cyber-leitlinie-verteidigungsministerium-erlaubt-
bundeswehr-cyberwar-und-offensive-digitale-angriffe/ (accessed 
30 November 2015). 
48  “Geheimhaltung versus Transparenz”, Behörden Spiegel 
(November 2015): 48. 
both conceptually and institutionally. Domestic policy 
should be adjusted in accordance with due diligence. 
This is the only way of restoring the citizens’, allies’ 
and EU partners’ trust lost during the Edward Snow-
den leaks. Trust is an indispensable prerequisite for 
European cooperation and politics. However, the im-
plementation of the three major challenges to an 
international cyber policy and cybersecurity policy – 
namely Europeen cooperation, inclusiveness and civil-
ian response – still leaves much to be desired: 
European Cooperation 
The methods used at the federal and EU levels to 
establish an overview of the cyber threat situation are 
unsatisfactory. To render criminal prosecutions more 
successful, proposals have been put forward to trans-
form the National Cyberdefence Centre into an um-
brella body for IT security (comparable to the Joint 
Anti-Terrorism Centre), since it does not currently 
bring together all federal and state authorities. There 
are also calls for more cooperation between national 
and EU authorities with a view to a European ex-
change of information.49 Some important partners, 
such as France or the Netherlands, criticise Germany 
not only because they find the “German position” 
frequently unclear, but also because they do not 
always know with which ministry to negotiate as part 
of the European coordination. Moreover, vital coordi-
nation at the EU level is sluggish, inter alia because 
the attribution of specific responsibilities is so com-
plicated. Since the parliamentary elections of 2013, 
coalition partners have been discussing whether Ger-
many needs an Internet ministry or a so-called digital 
agency.50 However, they have only been able to agree 
on an office without power or resources: the office 
of Digital Champion of the Federal Government, cur-
rently held by Gesche Joost. 
 
49  Since 2011, the European External Action Service has been 
responsible for the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), 
which produces civilian situation analyses for EU decision-
makers based on material delivered by national intelligence 
services. European External Action Service, EUINTCEN Fact Sheet 
(Brussels, 5 February 2015), http://eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/docs/ 
20150206_factsheet_eu_intcen _en.pdf (accessed 5 February 2016). 
50  German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 
Digitale Strategie 2025 (Berlin, March 2016). 
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Inclusiveness 
Downstream authorities such as the BSI, BKA or BND 
have already fundamentally adapted their institutions 
to repelling cyber attacks. In part, these reforms have 
only become public knowledge through leaked docu-
ments.51 However, the BSI’s much-discussed institu-
tional dependency remains unchanged.52 In February 
2016, the German Federal Cabinet appointed the 
president of the Cybersecurity Council, Arne Schön-
bohm, to be the president of the BSI. The public views 
his links to the IT and arms industries with suspicion. 
Critics also point out “that there are six to ten times 
the resources available for the offensive approach than 
there are for the defensive approach to cyber attacks 
or compromised IT security”.53 Besides, according to a 
member of the executive board of the Federal Associa-
tion of the Information Economy, Telecommunica-
tions and New Media (Bitkom), Susanne Dehmel, only 
one in five companies makes use of the IT consultan-
cies offered by the government.54 Moreover, compa-
nies that have fallen victim to cyber attacks tend to 
contact their state’s agency for internal security rather 
than the police, since the latter would have to launch 
a preliminary investigation wherever a criminal act 
was suspected. Consultations are underway on reform-
ing the intelligence services as well as improving par-
liamentary oversight of those services by the PKGr.55 
 
51  Following the leaks, Chief Federal Prosecutor Harald Range 
launched preliminary proceedings against the Internet portal 
netzpolitik.org, on suspicion of treason. However, the case was 
dropped after political intervention. See “Maas zweifelt an Ver-
fahren gegen ‘netzpolitik.org’”, Zeit Online, 31 July 2015, http:// 
www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2015-07/netzpolitik-ermittlungen-
journalisten-innenministerium-maassen (accessed 30 November 
2015). 
52  Despite media claims to the contrary – see e.g. “Bundesamt 
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) soll neue Bundes-
behörde werden”, Der Spiegel, 10 August 2014 – the BSI continues 
to report to the BMI. See Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 
der Informationstechnik (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG), § 1 Bundesamt für Sicherheit 
in der Informationstechnik. 
53  Ingo Ruhmann, “Aufrüstung im Cyberspace. Staatliche Hacker 
und zivile IT-Sicherheit im Ungleichgewicht”, Kriegführung im 
Cyberspace, supplement to Wissenschaft und Frieden, no. 3 (2015): 
12–16 (Dossier 79). 
54  German Federal Ministry of Defence, “Weißbuchprozess: Bun-
deswehr sucht Dialog mit Cyber-Community” (Berlin, 18 Septem-
ber 2015). 
55  Thomas Oppermann, Christian Flisek and Burkhard Lischka, 
Rechtsstaat wahren – Sicherheit gewährleisten! (Berlin: SPD-Bundes-
tagsfraktion, 16 June 2015), http://www.spdfraktion.de/sites/ 
default/files/2015-06-16-eckpunkte_reform_strafma-r-endfassung. 
pdf (accessed 30 November 2015). 
While the special rapporteur appointed by the Federal 
Government, Kurt Graulich, did examine the so-called 
NSA selector lists, which had been passed to the BND, 
the results leave many questions unanswered. In 
2015, the former president of the BfV and BND, Hans-
jörg Geier, argued that a code needed to be elaborated 
for regulating the exchange of information by intel-
ligence services and that a post of parliamentary 
ombudsperson for the intelligence services needed to 
be created, modelled on the parliamentary ombuds-
person for the armed forces.56 
Civilian Response 
The permanent secretary to the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, Hans-Georg Engelke, who is also the 
Federal Government’s IT Commissioner, emphasised 
that it was vital for the authorities to cooperate on IT 
security, but that the BMI had overall control on issues 
of cybersecurity. However, this claim is already being 
questioned as part of the 2016 white-paper discussion. 
Even the National Cybersecurity Council has not been 
able to solve the problem of the at-times inefficient 
distribution of resposibilities. In July 2013, while eluci-
dating the NSA affair, the German Federal Govern-
ment did publish an eight-point programme on im-
proving protection of the private sphere.57 However, 
the Cybersecurity Council did not publicly take a 
position on the questionable practices of the security 
services – for instance, committing industrial espio-
nage58 or keeping selector lists with spying targets.59 
 
56  Rudi Wais, “So könnte eine bessere Kontrolle der Nachrich-
tendienste aussehen”, Augsburger Allgemeine, 3 May 2015, http:// 
www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/So-koennte-eine-bessere-
Kontrolle-der-Nachrichtendienste-aussehen-id33933952.html 
(accessed 30 November 2015). 
57  Federal Ministry of Defence/Federal Ministry of Industry 
and Technology, Maßnahmen für einen besseren Schutz der Privat-
sphäre, Fortschrittsbericht (Berlin, 14 August 2013), http:// 
www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Nachrichten/ 
Pressemitteilungen/2013/08/bericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
58  German Federal Parliament, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die 
Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Jan Korte, Dr. André Hahn, Ulla Jelpke, 
weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke. Geheimdienstliche An-
griffe und Spionage bei deutschen Unternehmen, Drucksache 18/2281 
(Berlin, 5 August 2014). 
59  German Federal Parliament, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf 
die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD. Abhörprogramme der USA und 
Umfang der Kooperation der deutschen Nachrichtendienste mit den US-
Nachrichtendiensten, Drucksache 17/14560 (Berlin, 14 August 
2013); German Federal Parliament, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf 
die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Jan Korte, Christine Buchholz, Ulla 
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Nor did it comment on the cyber attack on the Ger-
man parliament. Many observers had expected a more 
proportionate reaction to the attack on Germany’s 
highest constitutional body. 
Digital Industrial Policy and the Importance 
of Private Actors 
Due diligence requires not only that institutional 
structures be constructed, it also needs sophisticated 
capabilities in information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) and their “intelligent connectivity”.60 
Over the past few decades, automisation has allowed 
the German economy to respond well to the global 
pressures to be competitive and innovative. The Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs wants to further boost 
small and medium enterprises using its Digital Strat-
egy 2025. Private actors play an extraordinarily im-
portant role in the Federal Government’s international 
cybersecurity policy. Industrial locations gain in stra-
tegic importance. The companies located there not 
only create jobs and added value, but also set com-
petitivity standards for whole economies.61 The Ger-
man Federal Government believes that there is still 
plenty of untapped potential in Germany’s ICT: 
according to a study by the Fraunhofer Institute for 
Systems and Innovation Research, Intelligent Net-
works could generate overall benefits to German 
society worth 56 million euros a year.62 
However, other countries have digitalised more 
successfully. The pioneering companies are mostly 
American, South Korean and Chinese. In 2014, the 
German Federal Government launched the pro-
grammes Digital Agenda and Digital Management. 
However, these programmes are meagrely equipped 
 
Jelpke, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke. Aktivitäten der 
Bundesregierung zur Aufklärung der NSA-Ausspähmaßnahmen und zum 
Schutz der Grundrechte, Drucksache 18/159 (Berlin, 12 December 
2013); German Federal Parliament, Hitzige Debatte über die BND-
NSA-Kooperation (Berlin, 21 May 2015), http://www.bundestag.de/ 
dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw21_de_aktuelle_stunde_nsa/ 
375278 (accessed 5 February 2016). 
60  German Federal Parliament, Unterrichtung durch die Bundes-
regierung. Strategie Intelligente Vernetzung, Drucksache 18/6022 
(Berlin, 18 September 2015), http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/ 
btd/18/060/1806022.pdf (accessed 30 November 2015). 
61  Initiative D21, ed., D21-Digital-Index 2015. Die Gesellschaft in der 
digitalen Transformation (Berlin, 2015). 
62  German Federal Parliament, IKT-Potenziale nicht ausgeschöpft 
(Berlin, 2 October 2015), http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/ 
2015_10/-/390352 (accessed 30 November 2015). 
compared with the US government’s programmes for 
funding research projects, for instance on developing 
quantum computers or the capability of analysing big-
data. The future project Industrie 4.0 has federal fund-
ing to the tune of around 200 million euros from the 
BMBF and BMWI. That is still not nearly enough to 
make them competitive. It must be remembered that, 
to meet due diligence requirements, the digital indus-
trial policy curently being developed needs the public 
and private sectors to cooperate, needs to be integrated 
into European harmonisation and needs to focus on a 
defensive cybersecurity policy. 
European Cooperation 
There has been criticism from the academia that 
“the Industrie 4.0 discourse [is] often too technical 
and national”,63 and that it needed to be more closely 
interconnected at the EU level than hitherto, because 
where (critical) infrastructure was concerned, solu-
tions for data security, operational safety and data 
protection were not being brought together.64 This is 
also reflected in the Federal Government’s programme 
Digital Agenda 2014–2017. It outlines seven fields of 
action including the “European and international 
dimension”.65 According to the CDU, CSU and SPD 
coalition agreement, a “European space of trust” is 
supposed to be created,66 but primarily with the help 
of national “measures to regain technological sover-
eignty”.67 It is not communicated by the government 
how this obvious contradiction could be resolved. Na-
tional IT summits are dominated by interested parties 
 
63  Sabine Pfeiffer, “Industrie 4.0 und die Digitalisierung der Pro-
duktion – Hype oder Megatrend?”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 65, 
no. 31–32 (2015): 6–12. 
64  According to Peter Liggesmeyer, director of the Fraunhofer 
Institute for Experimental Software Engineering and president 
of the German Informatics Society, speaking to the Digital 
Agenda committee; see “Umfassende Sicherheit für Industrie 
4.0”, heute im bundestag, no. 345 (1 July 2015). 
65  German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy/ 
German Federal Ministry for Traffic and Digital Infrastructure, 
ed., Digitale Agenda 2014–2017 (Berlin, August 2014), http://www. 
digitale-agenda.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/08/2014-08-20-
digitale-agenda.pdf?__blob=publication File&v=6 (accessed 30 
November 2015). 
66  Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU 
und SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode (Berlin, 27 November 2013), http:// 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-
koalitionsvertrag.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2015). 
67  Ibid., 147. 
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backed by well-organised, well-funded actors with a 
wide range of competences. Their special focus is first 
and foremost the German industrial policy. However, 
Industrie 4.0, meaning the Internet of Things, can only 
be designed at the European or even global level.68 
In May 2015, the European Commission presented a 
strategy for the digital single market.69 It expects this 
market, once realised, to contribute 520 billion euros 
to EU states’ gross domestic product. However, the 
Commission currently has only limited means avail-
able for developing key digital technologies. The Con-
necting Europe Facility (CEF) has budgeted about a 
billion euros spread over seven years for ICT funding 
for the EU member states. The financing programme 
Horizon 2020 is making 7.2 billion euros available for 
research for the EU 28, from 2014–2020.70 Since the 
Juncker Commission took up its posts in November 
2014, the Industrie 4.0 policy has been developed 
into a digital single market at the EU level with the 
help of a comprehensive legal package. In the Com-
mission’s view, policies to create and regulate the 
market, as well as distributive policies should be got 
off the ground as quickly as possible. Attaining the 
necessary speed is a problem, however, because the 
Commission first has to harmonise the legal policies 
of all 28 member states. A number of leading decisions 
published by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
2014 and 2015 are seen as important milestones of a 
European or transatlantic agreement on data-security 
and data protection policy.Important decisions in this 
context are those on the illegality of telecommunica-
tions data retention, on the right to be forgotten and 
on the illegality of the Safe Harbour Agreement.71 Even 
 
68  German Parliament, Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD, 
Industrie 4.0 und Smart Services – Wirtschafts-, arbeits-, bildungs- und 
forschungspolitische Maßnahmen für die Digitalisierung und intelligente 
Vernetzung von Produktions- und Wertschöpfungsketten, Drucksache 
18/6643 (Berlin, 10 November 2015), 3; Ansgar Baums, Martin 
Schössler and Ben Scott, eds., Kompendium Industrie 4.0. Wie digitale 
Plattformen die Wirtschaft verändern – und wie die Politik gestalten kann 
(Berlin, October 2015). 
69  European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, 
COM(2015) 192 final (Brussels, 6 May 2015), http://eur-lex.europa. 
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=IT 
(accessed 30 November 2015). 
70  European Commission, Horizon 2020. The EU Framework Pro-
gramme for Research and Innovation, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
programmes/horizon2020/ (accessed 30 November 2015); Eric 
Maurice, “China to Join Juncker’s Investment Scheme”, EU 
Observer (28 September 2015). 
71  European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court: “Electronic 
communications – Directive 2006/24/EC – Publicly available 
electronic communications services or public communications 
the legal status of its successor agreement between 
the EU and the US, the Privacy Shield, continues to be 
disputed.72 Furthermore, in late December 2015, the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission agreed 
a General Data Protection Regulation and a directive 
on network and information security.73 Industry repre-
sentatives, however, view European harmonisation 
more critically. They consider the ECJ decisions and 
the Commission’s legal initiatives to be “using politics 
for a digital industrial policy”74 and to be protectionist. 
Inclusiveness 
The importance of private actors can also be seen in 
the fact that they run much critical infrastructure, 
such as hospitals, banks, energy concerns and water-
works. Additionally, private actors often have the rele-
vant knowledge for gauging threat levels and devel-
oping tools to defend against threats. Only banks 
know how often they are attacked, and without infor-
mation from industrial companies about espionage, 
no intelligence service can take meaningful counter-
measures. Every act of regulation, development of 
standards and formulation of policy should therefore 
be carried out in solidarity with the private sector, if 
possible through public-private partnerships (PPP). For 
 
networks services – Retention of data generated or processed 
in connection with the provision of such services – Validity – 
Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union)” (Luxembourg, 8 April 2014), http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642& 
doclang=EN (accessed 30 November 2015); European Court of Jus-
tice, “An Internet search engine operator is responsible for for 
the processing that it carries out of personal data which appear 
on web pages published by third parties”, press release no. 70/14 
(Luxembourg, 13 May 2014); European Court of Justice, “The 
Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour 
decision is invalid”, press release no. 117/15 (Luxembourg, 6 Oc-
tober 2015). 
72  Annegret Bendiek and Evita Schmieg, EU-Außenhandel und 
Datenschutz. Wie lässt sich beides besser vereinbaren?, SWP-Aktuell 
10/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 
2016). 
73  European Parliament, Personal Data Protection: Processing and 
Free Movement of Data (General Data Protection Regulation), Procedure 
File 2012/0011(COD), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ 
ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/0011 (accessed 30 
November 2015). 
74  Ansgar Baums, “Der weiße Elefant: Industriepolitik durch 
die Hintertür des Datenschutzes?”, plattform-maerkte.de, 10 March 
2015, http://plattform-maerkte.de/der-weisse-elefant-industriepolitik- 
durch-die-hintertuer-des-datenschutzes/ (accessed 30 November 
2015). 
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example, Germany introduced measures to protect 
critical infrastructure in 2007 through the UP KRITIS, 
a PPP of operators of such infrastructure.75 At the EU 
level, the Commission presented a draft directive for 
network and information security in 2013. The direc-
tive is intended to make IT more secure for operators 
of critical infrastructure and large online service pro-
viders, and will oblige affected companies to report 
any security and data protection events or IT attacks. 
These requirements are intended for all operators and 
providers of “essential services”, such as in energy, 
water supply, transport, finance, health and the Inter-
net. The draft lists Internet exchanges, domain regis-
tration sites, online marketplaces and search engines, 
but not social networks. Small digital companies are 
also excluded. According to the directive, member 
states will have to build national reporting systems 
and exchange information with each other. “Compe-
tent authorities” such as the BSI, as well as specific 
Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) 
in addition to the already existing CERTs will be in-
volved. The German Federal Government used the 
long negotiation period from 2013 to 2015 to reach a 
solution nationally with its industry, before the EU 
agreed on the topic. The German Parliament passed 
its IT security law in July 2015, and thus introduced 
reporting obligations for serious cyber attacks and 
minimum standards for protecting critical infrastruc-
ture earlier than the EU.76 
However, close cooperation between state authori-
ties and private companies working in the area of 
critical-infrastructure security is not without risks. It 
is especially questionable whether the private sector 
can self-regulate if state actors allow themselves to 
become dependent on the interests of individual pri-
vate actors to the point where they are barely able to 
act meaningfully without them.77 This dependency 
becomes the more dangerous, the more tightly these 
companies monopolise the relevant knowledge. In 
such cases, the state must be careful to ensure that 
members of parliament and civil-society representa-
 
75  UP KRITIS office, ed., UP KRITIS. Öffentlich-Private Partnerschaft 
zum Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen (Bonn, February 2014), http:// 
www.kritis.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Kritis/DE/UP_KRITIS_
Fortschreibungsdokument.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 
30 November 2015). 
76  Ulrich Grillo, “Wege zur digitalen Republik”, Handelsblatt, 
28 August 2015. 
77  Annegret Bendiek, Kritische Infrastrukturen, Cybersicherheit, Daten-
schutz. Die EU schlägt Pflöcke für digitale Standortpolitik ein, SWP-Aktu-
ell 35/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013). 
tives regularly get the opportunity for critical ques-
tioning and for being involved in consulting process-
es.78 It is part of due diligence that not only the 
national and EU decisions but also the preparatory 
processes for decision-taking remain inclusive and 
open to the concerns of civil society, small and medium 
enterprises, and independent scholarship. 
Civilian Response 
Governments must resist the temptation to react to 
the growing number of digital attacks by building a 
digital arms industry and offensive cyberweapons.79 
The defence policy guidelines issued by the German 
Federal Ministry of Defence in May 2011 already con-
tain the stipulation that the German armed forces 
must encompass a range of abilities that is as broad 
as possible.80 Militarily, cyberspace is categorised as a 
so-called operative domain, comparable to land, air, 
ocean or space. According to the April 2015 Strategic 
Guideline on Cyberdefence, the military should be able 
“to limit, and if necessary even switch off, opponents’ 
use of the Internet and mobile communications” 
during operational missions.81 Such formulations and 
strategic decisions carry the risk of securitising or 
even militarising cyberspace, and thus creating a new 
threat scenario.82 This is conspicuous at conferences 
 
78  Federal Office of Information Security and Federal Office of 
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Bund-Länder Kooperation, 
http://www.kritis.bund.de/SubSites/Kritis/DE/Aktivitaeten/Nation
ales/BundLaender/bundlaender_node.html (accessed 5 February 
2016); Bavarian State Parliament, Schriftliche Anfrage des Abgeord-
neten Georg Rosenthal SPD vom 3. Dezember 2014.Zur Sicherheit kritischer 
Infrastruktur in Bayern, Drucksache 17/5186 (Munich, 27 March 
2015). 
79  An offensive weapon may be defined as “[a]n act or action 
initiated in cyberspace to cause harm by compromising com-
munication, information or other electronic systems, or the 
information that is stored, processed or transmitted in these 
systems.” NATO, Report on Cyber Defence Taxonomy and Definitions, 
Enclosure 1 to 6200/TSC FCX 0010/TT-10589/Ser: NU 0289. 
80  Federal Ministry of Defence, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien. 
Nationale Interessen wahren – Internationale Verantwortung übernehmen 
– Sicherheit gemeinsam gestalten (Berlin, 27 May 2011). 
81  Quoted by Forum InformatikerInnen für Frieden und gesell-
schaftliche Verantwortung (FIfF), “FIfF fordert einen öffentlichen 
Diskurs über die neue Cyber-Sicherheitsstratgie der Bundes-
wehr”, Presseerklärung (Bremen, 15 July 2015). 
82  James Andrew Lewis and Götz Neuneck, The Cyber Index. Inter-
national Security Trends and Realities (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], 2013, 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber-index-2013-
en-463.pdf (accessed 30 November 2015). 
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on international cyber and security policies: in between 
manufacturers of armoured vehicles, remote-con-
trolled drones and two-way radios, participants meet 
IT companies such as McAfee, FireEye, Kaspersky, 
Symantec and Microsoft as well as relevant start-ups 
offering highly specialised services. It is hardly sur-
prising, therefore, that the private IT security industry 
will have an annual turnover of around 155 million 
US dollars by 2020, according to estimates by the con-
sulting firm Frost & Sullivan.83 This market, which is 
developing fairly independently, offers “security as a 
service”84; its reverse side is “crime as a service”. 
 
 
83  Krzysztof Rutkowski, Global Cybersecurity Market Assessment. 
National Strategies Drive the Adoption of Cyber Solutions (17 February 
2014), http://www.frost.com/sublib/display-report.do?id=M875-01-
00-00-00 (accessed 30 November 2015). 
84  “Security as a service” (SECaaS) as a special case of “software 
as a service” means making IT security provisions available over 
the Internet and is a form of security-critical IT outsourcing. 
Christian Senk, Akzeptanz von Security-as-a-Service-Lösungen (Berlin: 
Bitkom, 2011). 
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Cyber Policies Characterised by Due Diligence 
 
The due diligence norm has direct relevance for stra-
tegic areas of Germany’s international cyber policy 
and cybersecurity policy. Germany, the EU and NATO 
have so far been pursuing a defensive cyberstrategy 
in these areas. This differentiates Germany from indi-
vidual EU and NATO partners such as France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands and the US, which bank on 
deterrence through threats of retaliation and on sur-
veillance and control technologies. Disastrous deci-
sions on retaliation and escalation based on misinter-
pretations could potentially result from this, since 
technical, political and legal reasons make it almost 
impossible to identify attackers. For these reasons, 
cyberinsecurity is growing within the international 
community. States are users of ICTs; they have to pro-
tect their citizens and data; and at the same time they 
have to regulate the digital sector, which is largely 
dominated by private companies. Creating universally 
secure components is considered extremely difficult, 
but where software is used by the state, transparency, 
testing and analysis are indispensable. One can deduce 
from this state of affairs which are the most important 
areas of an international cybersecurity policy: human-
rights and data protection policy; Internet Governance, 
fighting cybercrime; and developing international 
norms. These five areas overlap both conceptually and 
in terms of content. Unsurprisingly, problems arise 
from this, such as a conflictual coordination of respon-
sibilities, or inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in 
the policies which are supposed to deal with challeng-
es in cyberspace. In all of these areas, due diligence 
means taking to heart the three demands of European 
cooperation, inclusiveness and civilian response.85 
Human Rights and Data Protection 
Civil liberties on the Internet are constitutive of libe-
ral democracies.86 However, it is also clear – at the 
 
85  In choosing the following topics for an international cyber and 
security policy, I make no claim to exhaustiveness. The examples 
listed only serve to illustrate the requirements named, which each 
policy would have to meet according to due diligence principles. 
86  Ben Wagner, “Freedom of Expression on the Internet: Implica-
tions for Foreign Policy”, Global Information Society Watch (2011): 20–22. 
very latest since the revelations made by the former 
NSA employee Edward Snowden in 2013 – that even 
western secret services carry out passive surveillance 
on a massive scale and, moreover, that they knowingly 
infiltrate and compromise computer systems. Organi-
sations such as Freedom House with its annual study 
Freedom on the Net, Reporters without Borders, or 
activists for free software remind us again and again 
that governments and globally active IT corporations 
do not provide continual barrier-free Internet access 
across the world. These organisations claim, for 
instance, that the Facebook project Internet.org only 
gives access to Facebook. Freedom activists demand 
that Internet access should be a basic human right; 
at the UN, however, discussions on this topic are far 
from reaching a conclusion.87 
In a July 2012 resolution, the UN Human Rights 
Council emphasised that human rights are valid in 
the same way online as they are offline.88 In November 
2013, as part of a German-Brazilian initiative, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution on privacy in 
the digital age, in which, among other things, it pro-
scribes mass surveillance as illegal and undemocratic.89 
In May 2015, the UN’s special rapporteur on freedom 
of expression, David Kaye, called for the encryption 
of private communications to be made a standard. In 
early July of the same year, the UN Human Rights 
Council created the post of UN special rapporteur on 
privacy and appointed Joseph Cannataci of Malta.90 
 
87  Ben Wagner, “Könnt ihr mich hören?”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
15 September 2015. 
88  United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 
The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the 
Internet, A/HRC/20/L.13 (New York, 29 June 2012), http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/ 
Session20/A.HRC.20.L.13_en.doc (accessed 9 December 2015). 
89  United Nations General Assembly, Third Committee Approves 
Text Titled “Right to Privacy in the Digital Age”, as It Takes Action on 
18 Draft Resolutions, GA/SHC/4094 (New York, 26 November 2013), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gashc4094.doc.htm (accessed 
9 December 2015). 
90  As early as 2014, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights published a comprehensive report on privacy in the digi-
tal era. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/27/37 (New 
York, 30 June 2014). 
Cyber Policies Characterised by Due Diligence 
SWP Berlin 
Due Diligence in Cyberspace 
May 2016 
 
 
 
20 
However, democracies occasionally react to grave 
threats, such as Islamist terrorism, by declaring a state 
of emergency, as the US did after 9/11 or France after 
the Paris terror attacks of November 2015. One com-
mentator remarked that “proof of the maturity of the 
law” lay in in maintaining the equilibrium between 
civil liberties and security measures during states of 
emergency.91 The mission of the UN’s new special rap-
porteur is to report on this equilibrium as it relates to 
privacy. 
European Cooperation 
The European experience has taught us that, in the 
long term, integrated economic areas also need inte-
grated domestic and justice policies. The Lisbon Treaty 
gives great weight to the realisation of an “area of free-
dom, security and justice”. Basic rights were strength-
ened by a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was 
legally binding on the EU and came into force at the 
same time as the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and by the obli-
gation on the EU to ratify the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. What holds true for the single market also 
holds true for the transatlantic economic area. Where 
the transfer of economic data is concerned, the EU 
and USA have agreed to finalise a so-called Privacy 
Shield. Current negotiations concern a transatlantic 
agreement on data protection in criminal prosecution, 
which might include steps towards harmonising 
criminal offences and a reciprocal hand-over of rele-
vant data and information. Intensive cooperation 
among law-enforcement agencies is urgently needed 
to fight cybercrime. Online sources of funds for terror-
ism, such as digital financial services providers, can 
only be removed if the US and Europe cooperate closely 
on information sharing. A strengthened Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), the umbrella agree-
ment on data protection for law-enforcement purposes 
and modernised mutual legal assistance agreements 
(MLAs) are relevant steps forward for a constructive 
cooperation.92 Fighting terrorism also requires com-
 
91  Andreas Zielcke, “Reifeprüfung des Rechts”, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 3 December 2015. 
92  European Union, Agreement between the European Union and 
the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the 
Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, L 195/5 (Brussels, 
27 July 2010); Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the Council and the European Parliament on the Use of Passenger 
prehensive cooperation between the security services 
(as for instance between the “Five Eyes”93), which must, 
however, be subject to more stringent parliamentary 
controls. It is not in the interests of due diligence to 
have secret services exchange their insights informally 
and, in so doing, circumvent legal procedures, for 
instance those stipulated in agreements providing for 
mutual legal assistance.94 
Inclusiveness 
The more legally binding that regulations on human 
rights and data protection are, the more crucial it is to 
have laws implemented in an inclusive manner. That, 
at least, has been the experience in the EU. In Ger-
many and Europe, data protection is directly linked to 
the right to informational self-determination whereby 
citizens have a say in how their personal data may be 
used. This right far exceeds the norm of due diligence, 
because the state has a duty of protection towards its 
citizens that it must fulfil. Technically speaking, data 
protection and the state’s protective duties associated 
with it differ by area: international economic inter-
 
Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Pros-
ecution of Terrorist Offences and Serious Crime, 14670/15 (Brussels, 
2 December 2015). 
93  This is the most significant secret-services cooperation in 
the world, between the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. On this subject, see e.g. European Parliament, 
Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private 
and Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System) (2001/ 
2098(INI), A5-0264/2001 (Brussels and Strasbourg, 11 July 2001). 
On the comprehensive cooperation between secret services in 
fighting transnational terrorism, see Katarina Zivanovic, “Inter-
national Cooperation of Intelligence Agencies against Trans-
national Terrorist Targets”, PfP Consortium Quarterly Journal 8, no. 1 
(2008): 115–41; Richard J. Aldrich, “International Intelligence 
Cooperation in Practice”, in International Intelligence Cooperation 
and Accountability. Studies in Intelligence, ed. Hans Born, Ian Leigh 
and Aidan Wills (New York: Routledge, 2010): 18–41. 
94  Council of the European Union, Agreement with the United 
States on mutual legal assistance, 2009/820/GASP (Brussels, 
23 October 2009); German Federal Parliament, Gesetz zu dem 
Abkommen vom 25. Juni 2003 zwischen der Europäischen Union und den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über Auslieferung, zu dem Abkommen 
vom 25. Juni 2003 zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika über Rechtshilfe, zu dem Vertrag vom 14. Oktober 
2003 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staa-
ten von Amerika über die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, zu dem Zweiten Zu-
satzvertrag vom 18. April 2006 zum Auslieferungsvertrag zwischen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 
sowie zu dem Zusatzvertrag vom 18. April 2006 zum Vertrag zwischen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über 
die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (G-SIG: 16019368) (Berlin, 26 October 2007). 
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dependence, the fight against crime and secret-service 
cooperation. Specific arrangements are made in each 
of these areas because of the threat each poses to indi-
vidual freedoms and security; these arrangements in 
turn have an impact on how inclusive the regulations 
are.95 
Data protection has become an area of law for 
which responsibility within the EU is divided. Legally 
binding data protection provisions between states 
have so far only been concluded at a regional level, 
namely in 1981 in the shape of the European Council’s 
convention on data protection. 
The trialogue between representatives of the Com-
mission, the European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union led to an agreement in December 
2015 on a package of reforms for data protection in 
the shape of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR96), which replaced the EU’s data protection 
directive of 1995. The new Regulation will have to be 
transposed directly into national law as of 2018. The 
GDPR reform package includes a directive that stipu-
lates a harmonised legal framework for rules on data 
processing by the police and judicial authorities of the 
EU member states. The GDPR will outlaw the passing-
on of data gathered in the EU for commercial or other 
uses to courts or authorities of third states. The best-
known examples of this practice are the large digital-
service providers such as Amazon, Google and Face-
book, which store the data of European clients in the 
US using data protection provisions that violate Euro-
pean law. Where there are grave violations of the data 
 
95  Alongside the relevant paragraphs in Germany’s Basic Law, 
the legal bases can be found in the primary legislation on the 
security services, police and other authorities: Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz (BDSG), Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG), Gesetz 
zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses 
(Artikel 10-Gesetz – G10), Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamt 
(BKAG), Gesetz über die Errichtung des Bundesamtes für Sicher-
heit in der Informationstechnik (BSIG), Gesetz über das Zoll-
kriminalamt und die Zollfahndungsämter (Zollfahndungs-
dienstgesetz – ZFdG), Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst 
(BND-Gesetz – BNDG), Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bun-
des und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes 
und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Bundesverfas-
sungsschutzgesetz – BVerfSchG), Gesetz über den Militärischen 
Abschirmdienst (MAD-Gesetz – MADG), Verordnung über die 
Übermittlung von Auskünften an die Nachrichtendienste des 
Bundes (Nachrichtendienste-Übermittlungsverordnung – NDÜV). 
96  Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), document 5455/16 
(Brussels, 28 January 2016). 
protection law, data protection authorities will in 
future be able to impose drastic fines on companies. 
Such authorities are playing an ever more important 
role as instances for complaints and control because 
they verify how personal data are handled and can 
initiate sanctions.97 Their independence therefore 
needs to be reinforced and the influence of private-
sector companies on them needs to be restricted. The 
ECJ has clarified in two decisions (2010 and 2012) that 
data protection officials and their agencies must enjoy 
“complete independence”.98 
Civilian Response 
The data required to launch a criminal prosecution 
are not only generated through IT methods in the 
respective country. Any EU member state launching a 
prosecution will also always access data sources that 
were generated in allied states under different legal 
circumstances and do not meet the strict German or 
European requirements for data protection. While 
increased retention of data is viewed as an important 
instrument in fighting cybercrime, it has been inad-
missible to inform on or survey transmission data 
generated in the past since the German Federal Court’s 
decision of 2 March 2010. On 8 April 2014, the ECJ also 
quashed the EU directive on data retention, arguing 
that it was incompatible with the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. A draft law presented by Federal 
Justice Minister Heiko Maas in 2015 intends to store 
the telecommunications data of all German citizens 
for 10 weeks.99 Technically, the instrument is already 
almost outdated. 
 
97  The federal commissioner for data protection and freedom 
of information is expected to control the data protection efforts 
of telecommunications and postal services providers, federal 
agencies and other public federal offices. Unlike his or her col-
leagues at the state level, he or she will only be able to caution 
offenders, but not fine them. 
98  European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber). Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 
95/46/EC – Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and the free movement of such data – Article 28(1) – National 
supervisory authorities – Independence – Administrative scrutiny of those 
authorities. Case C-518/07 (Luxembourg, 9 March 2010); European 
Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber). Failure 
of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 95/46/EC – Processing 
of personal data and free movement of such data – Protection of natural 
persons – Article 28(1) – National supervisory authority – Independence – 
Supervisory authority and the Federal Chancellery – Personal and organi-
sational links. Case C-614/10 (Luxembourg, 16 October 2012). 
99  This does not apply to phone bugging undertaken by the 
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In any case, big data100 is becoming increasingly 
interesting for criminal prosecutions as well.101 Exist-
ing data sources, algorithms and predictive analytics 
are used for this.102 A further method is source tele-
communication surveillance, which is the authorities’ 
response to increasing communications encryption103 
at the federal level.104 
For this, investigating authorities install a pro-
gramme nicknamed ‘the Federal Trojan” on suspects’ 
computers.105 Emails, Internet telephony or chats 
can then be recorded directly within the system and 
transferred before the programme encrypts the com-
munication. The Federal Trojan is controversial 
because it could be considered a cyberweapon, whose 
 
police for preventative purposes or to breaches by the intel-
ligence services of telecommunications confidentiality where 
these are not under judicial oversight. Preventative police work 
is covered by the BKA Law of 25 December 2008. Gerd Lehmann, 
“Wie geht es jetzt – wie in Zukunft?”, Behörden Spiegel (July 2015). 
100  The expression “big data” describes the automated, com-
puter-supported processing of large and heterogenous volumes 
of data. It has great potential, in particular for industry and the 
empirical sciences. Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 
Big Data – Management und Analyse großer Datenmengen, http:// 
www.bmbf.de/de/big-data-management-und-analyse-grosser-
datenmengen-851.html (accessed 5 February 2016). 
101  An example is the Child Abuse Prevention System (CAPS) 
software, operated by the Diplomatic Council, a global think 
tank with special-advisor status at the UN. CAPS complements 
existing infrastructure, processes and solutions of prosecuting 
authorities across the world and supports the White IT alliance, 
which fights child pornography. Mass surveillance, unjustified 
general suspicion and the displacement of resources from per-
sonnel to technical solutions are considered to be the problematic 
side effects of the new prosecution techniques. James Byrne and 
Gary Marx, “Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention and 
Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Im-
pact”, Cahiers Politiestudies 3, no. 20 (2011): 17–40 (32). 
102  Walter L. Perry, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan C. 
Smith and John S. Hollywood, Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime 
Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (Santa Monica: RAND Cor-
poration, 2013). 
103  On this point, see Sandvine, ed., Global Internet Phenomena 
Spotlight: Encrypted Internet Traffic (Waterloo, Ontario, 2015), 
http://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-
phenomena/2015/encrypted-internet-traffic.pdf (accessed 5 Feb-
ruary 2016). 
104  In its Digital Agenda 2014–2017, the German Federal Gov-
ernment set itself the target of creating “security and protection 
on the Web”. It even announced its intention of becoming the 
“world’s no. 1 location for encryption”. 
105  German Federal Parliament, Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten 
Jan Korte, Andrej Hunko, Ulla Jelpke, Petra Pau, Jens Petermann, Frank 
Tempel, Halina Wawzyniak und der Fraktion Die Linke. Auskunft über 
Einsatz staatlicher Schadprogramme zur Computerspionage (“Staats-
trojaner”), Drucksache 17/7104 (Berlin, 25 October 2011). 
use would in that case have to be authorised by Parlia-
ment. It is possible that more cooperation between 
authorities and academia would be helpful in better 
judging and categorising the facts. In the field of 
prevention, the Federal Government started an inter-
departmental research programme on improving 
security in cyberspace in March 2015. Its focal points 
are (1) new technologies, (2) security and trustworthy 
information and communications systems, (3) areas 
of application for security and (4) privacy and data 
protection. The German Federal Ministry of Education 
will fund the programme, entitled “Secure and self-
confident in the digital world”, with about 180 mil-
lion euros until 2020.106 
Internet Governance 
The mission of Internet Governance is to agree tech-
nical standards and rules for the cross-border connec-
tivity of national networks.107 The substantial chal-
lenges here consist of guaranteeing the availability, 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of data. In 
its Digital Agenda 2014–2017,108 the German Federal 
Government supports the continuation of the multi-
stakeholder approach in Internet Governance. The way 
Germany proceeds in Internet Governance109 must be 
coordinated with other European states. Weak points 
in hardware and software products as well as issues of 
cryptology must also be discussed. In Internet Govern-
ance, the stakeholders – private users, the civil society, 
academia, companies and governments – are expected 
to act responsibly in their respective roles and partici-
pate in developing the Internet. This is intended to 
ensure that the decisions taken have a broad base of 
legitimacy. 
Important components of a functioning and reli-
able Internet-governance system are international 
organisations and fora such as the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which 
 
106  Federal Ministry for Education and Research, ed., Selbst-
bestimmt und sicher in der digitalen Welt 2015–2020. Forschungsrahmen-
programm der Bundesregierung zur IT-Sicherheit (Bonn and Berlin, 
2015). 
107  Federal Parliament, Aktueller Begriff. Internet Governance, Druck-
sache 11/14 (Berlin, 27 March 2014). Debates about the use and 
further development of the Internet use as their basis the Inter-
net model that combines network zones of the Internet and tech-
nical levels of communication. 
108  BMWi/BMI/BMVI, Digitale Agenda 2014–2017 (see note 65). 
109  Internet Society, IANA Transition, http://www.internetsociety. 
org/ianaxfer (accessed 5 February 2016). 
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is responsible for the stable functioning of the Inter-
net; the Information Society (ISOC); the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); 
and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a multi-
stakeholder forum with 3,700 members from 144 
countries, which was established following the UN 
World Summit on the Information Society.110 States 
should only intervene in a regulatory capacity when 
self-regulation can no longer guarantee democratic 
legitimacy, effectiveness, rule of law and transparency. 
Multilateral cooperation comes into play whenever 
concerns of states with less developed Internet capac-
ities are to be integrated into Internet Governance. In 
Germany, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy will be in overall control of the future of 
Internet Governance and Industrie 4.0. A series of 
reforms of Internet Governance can be inferred from 
the due diligence standard: 
European Coordination 
The German Federal Government should coordinate 
its national position with its EU partners and other 
states, especially the OECD, to create the precondi-
tions for asserting its views internationally at the UN 
(as it did, most recently, at the WSIS follow-up con-
ference in December 2015). It is pointless to stand 
alone, for the simple reason that Germany does not 
have sufficient negotiating power in the multilateral 
or Internet Governance fora. The EU position was set 
in June 2011 when the European Commisssion declared 
that the EU’s aim was to create “a single, un-fragmented 
network, subject to the same laws and norms that 
apply in other areas of our day-to-day lives”.111 The EU 
and Germany are in favour of a leading role for the 
Internet Governance Forum, whose term was extended 
by another five years at the UN summit in December 
2015. This is intended to prevent intergovernmental 
influence from being exerted to the disadvantage of 
 
110  Correct as of 2014. See IGF website, http://www.intgovforum. 
org/cms/ (accessed 5 February 2016). 
111  The relevant acronym is COMPACT (Civic Responsibilities, 
One Unfragmented Resource, Multistakeholder Approach to Pro-
mote Democracy and Human Rights, Sound Technological Archi-
tecture, Confidence and Transparent Governance). European 
Commission, Internet Policy and Governance Europe’s Role in Shaping 
the Future of Internet Governance, COM(2014) 72 final (Brussels, 
12 February 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0072&from=EN (accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2015). 
the multi-stakeholder approach, and to “internation-
alise” bodies and functions such as ICANN and IANA 
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority). By this, the EU 
means engaging in an inclusive dialogue with develop-
ing, emerging and industrialised countries in terms 
of innovative best practices, with the goal of ensuring 
Internet access even in rural areas (capacity-building). 
With the help of Internet Governance, it wants to con-
tinually improve ICT even in less developed regions 
and parts of the world. 
Inclusiveness 
Inclusiveness and legitimacy are highly controversial 
in global Internet Governance.112 However, civil-
society interest groups and members of parliament 
ought to be involved in the setting of global Internet 
norms, so that decisions are not only taken by 
technical bodies such as the Internet Architecture 
Board. Inclusiveness is the only guarantee that the 
necessary professional competence will be made 
available and that social acceptance for the norm-
setting processes will be generated. Beyond this, 
IANA’s function of assigning top-level domains – 
meaning the highest level of name resolution, such as 
*.com or *.de – should be put on a footing acceptable 
to all. The multi-stakeholder process in Internet 
Governance has been extended for five years because 
the UN General Assembly decided in late 2015 that the 
IGF should continue its activities.113 The security 
issues of individual governments, such as Russia or 
Saudi-Arabia, are inevitably playing an ever greater 
role in questions of Internet administration.114 
Civilian Response 
The preconditions for civilising digital communica-
tions are confidentiality, integrity and reliability. 
 
112  Annegret Bendiek, Christoph Berlich and Tobias Metzger, 
Die digitale Selbstbehauptung der EU, SWP-Aktuell 71/2015 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2015), 6f. 
113  United Nations General Assembly, Outcome Document of the 
High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Overall Review of the 
Implementation of the Outcomes of the World Summit on the Information 
Society, A/70/L.33 (New York, 13 December 2015). 
114  Monika Ermert, “WSIS+10: Zehn Jahre nach dem großen 
Gipfel”, heise online, 14 December 2015, http://www.heise.de/ 
newsticker/meldung/WSIS-10-Zehn-Jahre-nach-dem-grossen-
Gipfel-3043 792.html (accessed 5 February 2016). 
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Communication occurs in a global network of net-
works, whose servers are distributed all over the 
world. The location of each server therefore has little 
impact on the security or privacy of communications. 
Established certification standards are much more im-
portant. Users can encrypt emails, establish single-use 
email adresses115 or rely on De-mail.116 Nevertheless, 
states are claiming the right to access encrypted com-
munications in criminal prosecutions and therefore to 
build “backdoors”117 into the systems of suspects. Even 
well-encrypted emails generate metadata, which yield 
a lot of information about their sender, receiver, sub-
jects and time. Security services such as the NSA col-
lect such data on a grand scale. Much work is being 
carried out on encryption technologies to make this 
task more difficult.118 Users themselves play a decisive 
role in civilising communications. They can exert 
pressure to help enforce a user-friendly, sophisticated 
and fully differentiated encryption. It therefore makes 
sense for the Internet Governance committees to dis-
cuss cybersecurity more and more often as well. It 
would be inadvisable, however, to securitise Internet 
Governance or to allow states to exert increasing 
influence over it, with the exception of state bodies 
wanting to comply with due diligence. Fundamental-
ly, however, Internet Governance remains in the 
hands of private actors for the time being. 
 
115  Provisional email addresses are also offered under the 
names of disposable email or instant email. They are intended 
as much as possible to limit the loss of personal data when a loss 
of integrity, meaning a falsification of information, occurs with 
website operators. 
116  The Federal Government implemented the European direc-
tive 2006/123/EC on service provisions in the internal market via 
the De-Mail (De-Mail-G, 28 April 2011). Using De-mail, messages 
and documents can be sent and received confidentially, securely 
and verifiably. De-mail is offered by various e-mail providers in 
Germany and can be used, among other things, for digital cor-
respondence with many ministries. E-Mail made in Germany. Eine 
Initiative von GMX, Telekom und WEB.DE, http://www.e-mail-made-in-
germany.de/index.html (accessed 5 February 2015). 
117  “Backdoor” is the name given to weak points deliberately 
inserted into hardware and software, which make it possible to 
access certain functions of the computer or software in question 
at a later date. 
118  See for instance Johannes Wendt, “Wie Dark Mail die Meta-
daten abschaffen will”, Zeit Online, 7 January 2015, http://www. 
zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2015-01/darkmail-verschluesselung-
meta daten-email-lavabit (accessed 30 November 2015). 
Fighting Cybercrime 
The fight against cybercrime encompasses all non-
military measures that protect civilian targets from 
digital attackers. First and foremost, this concerns 
critical infrastructure and personal civil rights (and 
liberties). Since the 9/11 attacks, the UN has passed a 
great number of resolutions in the fight against terror-
ism that could serve as points of departure for cyber-
security as well. 
Germany has ratified the Council of Europe’s Buda-
pest Convention on Cybercrime119 and backs the EU’s 
cybersecurity strategy of February 2013.120 which uses 
the same approach as Germany, namely a cybersecu-
rity policy that is defensive and police-based in orien-
tation. So far, the EU has limited itself to coordinating 
the effort to create “an open, secure and protected 
cyberspace” by focusing on a) creating resilient IT 
structures, b) fighting cybercrime, c) developing defen-
sive cybercapacities, d) promoting industrial and tech-
nological developments in cybersecurity, and e) devel-
oping international cyberdiplomacy.121 The success 
and prospects of Europe’s internal security depend on 
it acting at the national, European and international 
levels whilst making use of the technological possibil-
ities of information exchange between these levels 
and giving that exchange legal protection. The glob-
alisation, automation and industrialisation of crime 
require international and European coordination, 
especially structural information exchanges between 
the prosecuting authorities.122 
European Coordination 
To enforce due diligence in the fight against cyber-
crime, substantive criminal law must urgently be 
harmonised, above all the definition of a criminal 
offence. Most EU member states have signed the Buda-
pest Convention and thus committed themselves to 
prosecuting offences occurring in cyberspace. How-
ever, the legal conceptions of EU countries vary wildly 
when it comes to deciding which actions in cyberspace 
 
119  Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, CETS No. 185 
(Budapest, 23 November 2001). 
120  European Commission, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European 
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN (2013) 1 final (Brus-
sels, 7 February 2013). 
121  Ibid., 4f. 
122  “Digitale Agenda”, interview with Boris Pistorius, Minister 
of the Interior of Lower Saxony, Behörden Spiegel (February 2014). 
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should be rated crimes and how they should be pun-
ished. It would not be appropriate to harmonise crimi-
nal offences using intergovernmental agreements of 
individual state’s regulations. Rather, what is needed 
is a process that involves all EU states and orientates 
itself on the due legislative processes of the EU. 
As of yet, however, the EU does not have the author-
ity to harmonise criminal law. Its current legal and 
political system still rests on criminal law applying 
and operating within national borders. At the same 
time, it is becoming more difficult to categorise access 
rights because cloud services, for example, operate 
beyond continent. The EU should nevertheless con-
centrate on the issue of criminal prosecution while 
applying the “European agenda on security”. There are 
a number of further meaningful initiatives, such as 
the European arrest warrant, the creation of a Euro-
pean prosecution service or the adoption of mutual 
legal assistance agreements, including all relevant 
transatlantic agreements. To disincentivise companies 
from relocating their business abroad and thus cir-
cumventing due diligence obligations, the EU’s data-
security standards (the NIS directive) should be brought 
into line with those set in the US by the National Insti-
tute of Standards. Transatlantic cooperation has an 
important role to play not only in public-private part-
nerships, but also at the official level, for instance in 
the EU-US working group on fighting cybercrime.123 
Inclusiveness 
Security agencies on the EU and national levels will 
have to get used to the fact that the fight against 
cybercrime can no longer dispense with the coopera-
tion of private actors. A clear separation between 
private and public sector can hardly be upheld in this 
area, because the companies that have been attacked 
are frequently the only bodies that have the means of 
resolving cyber attacks. Corporations like Microsoft 
even obtain court orders authorising so-called hack-
backs: authorising them, in other words, to penetrate 
the attackers’ IT systems in turn, for instance to 
destroy groups of automated malware, so-called bot-
 
123  Annegret Bendiek, Umstrittene Partnerschaft. Cybersicherheit, 
Internet Governance und Datenschutz in der transatlantischen Zusammen-
arbeit, SWP-Studie 26/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, December 2013); European Parliament, Directorate-General 
for Internal Policies, Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond: 
Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses, Study for the LIBE Committee 
(Brussels, 2015). 
nets.124 While it remains difficult to attribute cyber 
attacks unequivocally – for instance, because of falsi-
fied invoices, sabotaged computer systems and pass-
word theft – perpetrators nonetheless leave digital 
traces. Reconstruction and analysis – IT forensics – are 
thus the pivot of criminal prosecution.125 The German 
authorities, including the BKA and the state bureaux 
of investigation, therefore back the action plan of the 
European Police Office (Europol).126 Today, prosecut-
ing authorities also systematically look for dangers in 
the IT system (threat hunting), instead of merely 
reacting to attacks. Where such a hunt is successful, 
attackers may be prevented from accessing the most 
sensitive areas. However, this presupposes that data is 
stored in such a way that it can be used in court. 
Gathering evidence from large and complex data 
banks takes time and requires extremely powerful 
computers. Digital forensics face enormous challeng-
es. That is why authorities bank on support from 
private IT forensic scientists to solve crimes. But 
public-private cooperation on cybersecurity has its 
weak points, among other reasons because industry 
has so far not markedly got involved in fighting crime, 
except for the BSI initiative Allianz für Cyber-
Sicherheit and for CERT exchanges. The Global Player 
Initiative is a network founded back in 2006, in which 
the BKA and (currently) 62 large enterprises partici-
pate. Overall, the BKA cooperates with about 630 
companies. Frequently, this exchange of information is 
still more of a one-way street, because small and 
medium enterprises in particular do not have the 
capacities for taking far-reaching IT-security measures. 
In Germany, operators of critical infrastructure are 
obliged to report cyber attacks and introduce 
minimum security standards for their IT. However, 
security issues concerning software products and 
external cloud services have not yet been sufficiently 
resolved. Binding security tests and an extension of 
the manufacturer’s liability are currently under inten-
sive discussion.127 
 
124  Janine S. Hiller, “Civil Cyberconflict: Microsoft, Cybercrime, 
and Botnets”, Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 31, no. 2 
(2015): 163–214. 
125  German Federal Office of Information Security, Leitfaden 
“IT-Forensik”, version 1.0.1 (Bonn, March 2011). 
126  Federal Parliament, Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeord-
neten Andrej Hunko, Jan van Aken, Wolfgang Gehrcke, weiterer Abge-
ordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke, Maßnahmen im operativen Europol-
Aktionsplan für das Jahr 2015 zu Cyberangriffen mit deutscher Beteili-
gung, Drucksache 18/4585 (Berlin, 10 April 2015). 
127  German Federal Office of Information Security, ed., Die Lage 
der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2015 (see note 27). 
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Civilian Response 
In accordance with the EU’s cybersecurity strategy, 
cybercrime shall be fought using exclusively non-
military means. According to the strategy the relevant 
agencies need to be given more supranational com-
petences and more funds. These include Europol’s 
European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)128; the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA); 
and the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
(Eurojust). The cyberexercises that are regularly co-
ordinated by ENISA may not be spectacular, but they 
are important for building resilient IT structures in 
accordance with due diligence. 29 EU-EFTA member 
states and 200 governmental organisations participated 
in the Cyber Europe 2014 exercise.129 The exercise was 
designed to test how to improve cooperation between 
states in coping with cybersecurity incidents in the 
whole of Europe; how the many parallel communica-
tions relations impact on generating an overview of 
the national and European situation; and what con-
sequences a comprehensive European cybercrisis might 
have for the member states’ press and PR activities. 
At the operative level, the continuous cooperation of 
the IT emergency teams with other CERTs is indispen-
sable. The BSI, for instance, is a member of the Euro-
pean Government CERTs Group (EGC), an informal 
group at the European level, and of the Forum for 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), an in-
ternational coalition of about 200 state and private 
CERTS.130 
Cyberdefence 
The NATO centre for repelling cyber attacks, the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE), is financed by 11 member states of the 
Alliance, but is not part of its command structure. 
In the Tallin Manual, which includes the work of 
German academics, the Centre presented proposals 
 
128  Europol, European Cybercrime Center (EC3), http://www.europol. 
europa.eu/content/megamenu/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3-
1837 (accessed 5 February 2016). 
129  European Network and Information Security Agency, ENISA 
CE2014. After Action Report (Heraklion, 2014). 
130  European Government CERTs Group, Members of the European 
Government CERTs Group, http://www.egc-group.org/contact.html 
(accessed 30 November 2015); Forum for Incident Response and 
Security Teams, FIRST Members, http://www.first.org/members 
(accessed 30 November 2015). 
for codifying the right to war (ius ad bellum) and the 
law of war (ius in bello) for cyberspace.131 Its authors 
also attempted to elaborate how due diligence might 
be best served in cyberspace. For example, the Tallinn 
Manual states that “[a] State shall not knowingly allow 
the cyber infrastructure located in its territory or under 
its exclusive governmental control to be used for acts 
that adversely and unlawfully affect other States.” 
In line with its constitutional obligation to defend 
the Alliance, the German military also primarily has 
defensive cybercapabilities, meaning that it is geared 
for cyberdefence.132 Cyberdefence includes measures 
for repelling threats not just against individual per-
sons or enterprises but also against the state and its 
social foundations. The German armed forces view 
themselves as the central instance for repelling exter-
nal dangers in cyberspace as well. According to Ger-
many’s security strategy, IT systems in military use 
and the German share of cyberspace are also part of 
cyberdefence. For some time now, it has been clear not 
only that digital conflicts are increasingly carried out 
in cyberspace, but also that military deployments are 
occurring below the threshold of armed conflict and 
that non-state actors are involved. The German Federal 
Government therefore explicitly points out that mili-
tary actors may also be responsible for cyber attacks. 
European Cooperation 
Germany’s cyberdefence policy should push for Euro-
pean and Atlantic cooperation early on, always with 
the aim of enforcing the guiding principle of due 
diligence. National measures intended to check and 
increase the quality of the components and key tech-
nologies in use should be based on the clarification 
and exchange of information within the EU, and 
between the EU and NATO. In December 2013, the 
European Council announced that it would intensify 
EU-NATO cooperation. In November 2014, it adopted 
the Cyber Defence Policy Framework.133 This is intend-
 
131  Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare (see note 9). 
132  Federal Ministry of Defence, “Von der Leyen reformiert 
Cyber-Strukturen” (Berlin, 17 September 2015). 
133  Council of the European Union, EU Cyber Defence Policy 
Framework, 15585/14 (Brussels, 18 November 2014), http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/ 
dv/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework_/sede160315 
eucyberdefencepolicyframework_en.pdf (accessed 3 December 
2015). 
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ed to increase the protection for missions of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the 
security of communications in the European External 
Action Service (EEAS).134 
In its strategic concept of 2010, NATO declared that 
cyber attacks can “reach a threshold that threatens 
national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and 
stability”.135 As a result, at its summit in Wales in June 
2014, the Alliance adopted its Enhanced Cyber Defence 
Strategy, with the aim of building resilient ICT-struc-
tures in the military field.136 Alongside consultation 
and support processes, there will also be joint exer-
cises, for instance on handling cyber attacks. Every 
year, NATO Computer Incident Response Capability 
(NCIRC), which has also been entrusted with operative 
IT security and network surveillance, organises its 
three-day Cyber Coalition.137 The NCIRC Coordination 
Centre is responsible for coordinating with member 
states and partner organisations for this event, such 
as the EU, OSCE or International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU). Cooperation between NATO and the EU-
CERT has also been decided.138 European cooperation 
in cyberdefence comprises research as well as industry 
as a “first line of defence”.139 
 
134  European External Action Service, EU International Cyberspace 
Policy, http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cybersecurity/ (accessed 
5 February 2016). 
135  NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept 
for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Brussels, 2010), http://www.nato.int/strategic-
concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf (accessed 2 December 
2015). 
136  “The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of 
Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, 
and defence.” NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration”, Pressemit-
teilung 120/2014 (5 September 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed 3 December 
2015).) 
137  The CCDCOE exercise “Locked Shields” should also be men-
tioned here. 
138  Andreas Wilkens, “EU und NATO kooperieren enger im 
Kampf gegen Cyber-Terrorismus”, heise online, 10 February 
2016, http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/EU-und-Nato-
kooperieren-enger-im-Kampf-gegen-Cyber-Terrorismus-3098911. 
html?wt_mc=rss.ho.beitrag.atom (accessed 15 March 2016). 
139  According to Alexander Vershbow, NATO Deputy Secretary-
General, quoted on the website of the NATO Industry Cyber Part-
nership Forum, http://www.nicp.nato.int/ (accessed 3 December 
2015). 
Inclusiveness 
Armed forces may only be deployed in cyberspace 
under the same conditions of constitutional law that 
apply to conventional military capabilities. In Ger-
many, this concerns primarily Art 87a GG and Art 24 
para 2 GG. If these preconditions are met, it is legally 
possible to take damaging (counter-)measures against 
an attacker’s IT systems, including information-gather-
ing and reconnaissance. Furthermore, the German 
armed forces can use their own capacities to protect 
the whole state from IT attacks. The legal basis for this 
is Art 35 para 1 GG and regulations on the use of the 
armed forces to repel and cope with a particularly 
grave incident. However, each armed deployment of 
German military forces requires the assent of the Ger-
man Parliament under a law known as the Parlaments-
beteiligungsgesetz.140 In developing a German cyber-
defence policy, it is therefore advisable to reflect early 
on about involving the Federal Parliament. The legal 
precondition of parliamentary approval that exists in 
Germany is a major asset that must not carelessly be 
sacrificed to technological progress. In this context, 
there needs to be a debate on parliamentary approval 
after the fact, which was legitimised by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its so-called Nafurah deci-
sion141 in the summer of 2015. This dealt with the pos-
sibility of informing the German Parliament only in 
retrospect in cases where there is “Gefahrenverzug”, 
meaning looming danger. 
Civilian Response 
In times of peace, due diligence in cyberdefence 
means pursuing primarily civilian approaches to the 
preventative and reactive protection of one’s IT sys-
tems and infrastructure. However, Germany is also 
arming itself militarily for cyberspace. Since Decem-
ber 2011, the German military’s unit for computer 
network operations142 has had an initial capability, 
 
140  German Federal Parliament, Gesetz über die parlamentarische 
Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte 
im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz, ParlBG) (Berlin, 18 March 
2005). 
141  This was triggered by the participation of the German 
armed forces in an evacuation operation in Libya in 2011. Consti-
tutional Court, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 23. September 2015 – 
2 BvE 6/11 – Rn. (1–125). 
142  Kommando Strategische Aufklärung, Über uns, 25 November 
2013. 
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meaning “a degree of personnel and material readi-
ness for duty [...], which makes it possible, within 
limits, to have an impact through cyberspace”.143 
Thus, several battalions with different tasks in elec-
tronic warfare report to the strategic reconnaissance 
commando (KSA).144 During the elaboration of the 
2016 White Paper, defence minister von der Leyen 
announced that the German armed forces were estab-
lishing a cyberspace and information-space division 
(CIR).145 It is certain that cyberspace, as the fifth opera-
tional domain alongside land, air, sea and space, will 
have an impact on the German military’s deployabil-
ity. To avoid a digital arms race,146 cyberdefence needs 
to focus above all on building resilient structures.147 
However, improved defensive capacities are not 
enough. It is also essential to develop high-security IT 
in close collaboration with other EU states and allies, 
and to curb the worldwide “black market” for vulner-
abilities in IT systems, and especially zero-day mar-
kets.148 
However, even within the German armed forces 
there are concerns that the new division (CIR) could 
develop in ways that are similar to the United States 
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), which is not subject 
to any parliamentary oversight and works closely with 
 
143  Thomas Wiegold, “Cyber-Attacke auch für Deutschland 
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cyber-attacke-auch-fur-deutschland-ein-moglicher-angriff-nach-
dem-volkerrecht/ (accessed 15 March 2016). 
144  Federal Ministry of Defence, Dienststellen der Streitkräftebasis, 
Kommando Strategische Aufklärung, http://www.kommando. 
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(accessed 30 November 2015). 
145  Federal Ministry of Defence, “Tagesbefehl der Ministerin: 
Bundeswehr wird im Cyber-Raum zukunftsfähig” (see note 45); 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Von der Leyen reformiert 
Cyber-Strukturen” (see note 132). 
146  Ronald Deibert, “Tracking the Emerging Arms Race in 
Cyberspace”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 1 (2011): 1–8. 
147  Federal Parliament, first committee of inquiry, Stenografisches 
Protokoll der 9. Sitzung, 18. Wahlperiode (Berlin, 26 June 2014), 
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(accessed 30 November 2015). 
148  “A Zero Day Exploit Attack (ZETA) is an attack carried out 
on the same day as the software weak point is discovered. In this 
case, the weak point is exploited before the software manufac-
turer can close it with a fix.” Kaspersky Lab, Was ist ein Zero-Day-
Exploit?, http://www.kaspersky.com/de/internet-security-center/ 
definitions/zero-day-exploit. See also Federal Office of Informa-
tion Security, ed., Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2015 (see 
note 27). 
the NSA. There are concerns that the activities of the 
CIR cannot be reconciled with the traditional under-
standing of the “citizen in uniform”. The manner in 
which the capabilities to be created are strategically 
and operationally integrated into the German armed 
forces will therefore be decisive. 
Developing International Norms 
Developing international norms is a central part of 
Germany’s international cyber policy. Germany ex-
ports technological products worldwide and receives 
primary products from almost all of the world’s coun-
tries. However, since adjusting to standards always has 
its costs, it is very much in Germany’s interests wher-
ever possible to turn its own standards into the inter-
national norm. For this, its international cyber policy 
acts in three areas. Its first goal is to reach agreements 
with third parties on confidence and security-building 
measures. Its second aims is to conclude agreements 
that set international standards for the approval of 
hardware and software and define norms for respon-
sible conduct by states. Its third target is applying 
international law in cyberspace. 
European Cooperation 
For the cyberdefence policy to enforce due diligence 
in cyberspace, the EU needs to be placed in a position 
where it can engage more closely in developing inter-
national norms. In April 2015, the EU’s High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Fede-
rica Mogherini, and the Dutch Foreign Minister Bert 
Koenders emphatically pointed out the necessity of 
taking states up on their promise for their behaviour 
in cyberspace. Mogherini and Koenders believe that 
insufficiently secured central infrastructure is a threat 
to national and international security.149 In this, they 
represent all 28 member states, which have agreed on 
this line in cyberdiplomacy.150 
However, constructive criticism on the global level 
is extremely difficult because there are such divergent 
views throughout the world on various aspects of in-
formation security. Contentious areas include the range 
 
149  Bert Koenders and Federica Mogherini, “Cyber Space 
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of topics, threat perception and the role of the UN and 
governments, including vis-a-vis actors from the pri-
vate sector and civil society. Germany is a prominent 
representative at all of these international debates. 20 
states, including five EU member states, took part in 
the fourth round of the negotiations of governmental 
experts on information security (UN GGE).151 The final 
reports of the expert rounds were adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. However, the concrete application 
of international law to cyberspace remains a point of 
contention. Selected EU states are engaging on the UN 
level and represent the EU. There is closer agreement 
between Europe’s “Big Three” as well as bilaterally with 
the US and Israel in the group of likeminded western 
states (which alongside Germany, Spain, France and 
Great Britain also comprises Colombia, Israel, Japan, 
South Korea and the US). A fifth round of GGE nego-
tiations is scheduled to start in 2016. The EU states 
involved should focus their energies on giving EU con-
cerns more emphasis in the GGE in future, as stipulated 
in the Council’s conclusions on cyberdiplomacy.152 In 
this, the EU needs to speak “with one voice”, because 
a divided EU would find it very difficult to assert its 
interests over those of the US, Russia or China. 
Inclusiveness 
It is part of the tasks of the German and EU inter-
national cyber policy and cyberdefence policy to 
prevent a digital arms race by prioritising civilian 
approaches and confidence-building measures. On 
the occasion of its OSCE presidency in 2016, Germany 
intends to adopt a new package of confidence- and 
security-building measures that particularly integrates 
science and the civil society.153 Because of its experi-
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Diplomacy (see note 150); Eneken Tikk-Ringas, Developments in 
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153  Annegret Bendiek, Christoph Berlich and Tobias Metzger, 
Drei Prioritäten für die Cyberdiplomatie unter dem deutschen OSZE-
Vorsitz 2016, SWP-“Kurz gesagt” (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 5 November 2015), http://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
publikationen/kurz-gesagt/drei-prioritaeten-fuer-die-
cyberdiplomatie-unter-dem-deutschen-osze-vorsitz-2016.html 
(accessed 5 February 2016); Representation of the Federal Repub-
ence in arms control and confidence-building that 
span opposing blocs, the German OSCE chairmanship 
is developing CSBMs in all three areas for cyberspace. 
The OSCE is a regional approach that complements 
and supplements the work of the GGE. It is expected 
to safeguard the mutual commitment that no com-
puter systems or cyberinfrastructure on the territories 
of its member states will be used for attacks on other 
states. But provisions must also not be misused for 
restricting the freedom of the Internet. In partnership 
with science and companies, the OSCE intends to pro-
mote the development of protective measures that are 
both technical and regulatory to make critical infra-
structure in OSCE states more resilient. Cybersecurity 
can only be guaranteed if stakeholders do so in coordi-
nation with national governments and the EU, and 
involve as many concerned parties as possible.154 The 
EU approach of “inclusive multi-stakeholderism” is 
increasingly becoming the trademark of international 
cyber policy and digital diplomacy. 
Civilian Response 
The development of international norms raises politi-
cal questions with direct relevance for the global asser-
tion of human rights and for national security. Since 
June 2013, Germany has been a member of the Free-
dom Online Coalition, a multi-stakeholder platform 
that now comprises 28 countries and campaigns for 
liberties in cyberspace.155 Due diligence also applies 
to German companies in the information, communi-
cations and Internet economy. They must therefore 
ensure that their exports are not used by authoritarian 
regimes to abuse civil liberties on the Internet. The 
German Federal Government should continue to work 
towards worldwide controls on the trade in digital 
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arms.156 For this, highly-developed countries should 
extend the Wassenaar Agreement157 on arms export 
controls as quickly as possible, so that the trade in 
digital arms will in future be subject to the same 
requirements as the trade in conventional war equip-
ment. The first steps have been taken towards intro-
ducing international export-control mechanisms and 
incorporate surveillance technologies in sanctions 
packages. These approaches could be continued, at 
least on the regional level, using the EU’s dual-use 
regulation.158 In particular, the export of such prod-
ucts to countries with authoritarian regimes needs to 
be more strictly prohibited than before. To this end, 
a standardised definition of cyberweapons must be 
elaborated and monitoring regimes be conceived at 
the EU and UN levels.159 For the time being, it is un-
likely that governments will conclude multilateral 
international-law treaties, which provide a binding 
settlement on the use of cyberspace for military opera-
tions, based on the disarmament and arms control 
model. The reasons for this area lacking definition of 
the term “cyberweapons”; problems with implementa-
tion and verification; and the difficulty of attributing 
cyber attacks unequivocally under international law. 
Bilateral agreements, such as the one on fighting 
cybercrime concluded between the US and China, are 
evidently easier to push through.160 Fundamentally, 
due diligence should be interpreted as being recip-
rocal, meaning that norms and rules should apply 
between individual states as well as between states 
and private companies, in particular with a view to 
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espionage and other military purposes, such as hybrid 
warfare. Dual-use technology is an awkward subject in 
the cooperation between civilian and military actors 
as well as between public and private actors, especially 
in the transatlantic alliance. Euro-Atlantic cooperation 
would be a good prelude to committing states within 
the EU and NATO to reporting weak points in IT prod-
ucts to the manufacturers, rather than deliberately 
building in backdoors. It is undeniably common prac-
tice to use cyberweapons, such as zero-day exploits. 
At least, their use should be more strictly limited, by 
having to fulfil clear criteria. The proliferation of 
cyberweapons, however, must definitely be stopped. 
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(Improving) The Implementation of Due Diligence 
 
Germany’s international cyber policy needs a strategic 
reorientation that takes German and European inter-
ests into account. As a European middle-size power, 
Germany will only be able to find this new focus in a 
perspective that is in keeping with its integration in 
European Union, democratic values and firm commit-
ment to civilian forms of politics. The due diligence 
norm lends itself to that. It expresses the cooperative 
and global character of a good international cyber and 
cybersecurity policy, without concealing its domestic 
foundations. Modern (cyber) foreign and security 
policies are always also domestic policies. 
Germanys has started to implement the due dili-
gence principle in its cyber policy. The fundamental 
idea of due diligence is that states bear responsibility 
for threats that emanate from their territory and must 
do everything in their power in cooperation with 
other EU states and allies to prevent damage to third 
parties. Developments in German cybersecurity struc-
tures are already taking great strides in this direction. 
They are at least partly coordinated with the EU and 
bring together a great number of interested parties. 
In digital industrial policy cooperation between state 
and private actors with the aim of pooling profession-
al expertise is needed to give due diligence greater 
weight. In both areas, there is a marked precedence 
of civilian over military approaches. 
Nevertheless, a series of starting-points remain for 
improving Germany’s International and European 
cyber policy and cyberdefence policy: 
First: The norm of due diligence must be lastingly 
enforced in international relations. For the time 
being, it merely has the status of a controversial legal 
standard and is not included as a binding regulation 
in bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the final 
report of the fourth round of UN GGE negotiations, 
the represented states commit to stopping attacks that 
emanate from their territories and also commit to not 
deliberately damaging other countries’ critical infra-
structure or IT emergency teams. The agreement 
between the US and China on jointly fighting cyber-
crime and on outlawing industrial espionage is also a 
promising step that can serve as a model for bilateral 
agreements between other countries. Here, it will be 
important to work politically towards a general recog-
nition of due diligence and also to create the necessary 
institutional structures in the medium term to guar-
antee that the norm is being applied effectively. The 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a leading role 
in coordinating an international cyber policy and 
cyberdefence policy at the EU level. It is the only depart-
ment that rises above the sectional perspectives of 
individual policy areas; and as a cross-ministerial re-
sponsibility. 
Germany’s international cyber policy and cyber-
security policy should be formulated even more strong-
ly inside EU structures. Only because of the European 
single market is Germany able to act with the neces-
sary vigour on the international stage. A promising 
starting-point is the Friends of the Presidency Group 
(FoP) on Cyber Issues. It was created in 2013 to support 
the implementation of the EU cybersecurity strategy. 
In FoP, the various cyber topics are coordinated hori-
zontally at the EU level. While the working group has 
so far only been set up for three years at a time, it has 
already become the most important hub for coordi-
nating national interests in EU cyber policy. 
Second: Only a close cooperation between the EU 
and USA is the adequate framework for drafting inter-
national norms. Where they agree, they have enough 
political influence to tilt the scales towards a more 
effective enforcement of due diligence. What is urgently 
needed now is a transatlantic initiative on the attribu-
tion problem, meaning the difficulty of unequivocally 
attributing cyber attacks to an actor. States frequently 
use this difficulty as a way out of due diligence by 
shifting the blame onto third parties. In line with 
the TTIP negotiations, both an economic data transfer 
and a bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance 
need to be agreed on. The EU’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation should quickly be complemented by 
Privacy Shield agreed by the EU and the US that meets 
the legal criteria formulated by the ECJ. Implementa-
tion of the the Privacy Shield should take into account 
the legal reservations expressed in the ECJ’s decision 
of October 2015. This is the only basis for giving com-
panies and consumers the necessary legal certainty. 
With its General Data Protection Regulation, the EU 
has defused the problem of European citizens’ data 
being stored and evaluated according to US law. How-
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ever, it has also set a questionable precedent of extra-
territorial applicability of its legislation – despite 
having previously criticised the US for such practices. 
In practice, global companies now store any data of 
European citizens in Europe to prevent clashing with 
EU law. With this decision, the EU will applys its own 
law on others’ sovereign territory. Extra-territorial 
effects of national law contradict the principle of due 
diligence obligations. States such as the US and China 
are likely to have fewer scruples in future about pass-
ing legal provisions with extra-territorial effect. This 
could result in a collision course for different national 
legal systems, which would encourage the fragmenta-
tion of the global economic space and the Internet. 
The Privacy Shield for data transfer and the transatlan-
tic agreement on data protection in criminal cases are 
therefore vital steps in the effort to stop this process. 
Third: Due diligence obligations should be imposed 
on those states which have been attacked, on whose 
territory the servers are located, or over whose data 
cables attacks are carried out. The density of these 
obligations should depend on the ability of the states 
in questions to exert influence and on their ICT capac-
ities. It also seems sensible to strengthen the substan-
tive criminal law and use it for deterrence. Moreover, 
IT forensics in particular should be expanded so that 
perpetrators of cyber attacks become easier to identify. 
Non-state actors should be called on to participate 
actively. Where companies are forced to break the law 
because of differences in national legal standards (for 
instance, on the one hand, a state’s demand for infor-
mation that must be complied with, and on the other 
hand, a prohibition on handing out data for data 
protection reasons), the states involved do not live up 
to the principle of the rule of law. Given the experi-
ence of European integration, it would be advisable 
to confer competences on a supranational jurisdiction 
along the lines of the European Court of Justice or 
courts of arbitration, so as to enforce due diligence 
better on this point. This would also reduce legal un-
certainty for companies. On the other hand, it must 
be possible to force companies to make their software 
products more secure. At the very least, the criteria for 
transparency, testing and certification must be made 
more stringent at least on the EU level within ENISA. 
Fourth: The growing complexity of IT-protected 
weapons systems and the high quality that detected 
cyber attacks now attain demand much cybersecurity 
know-how. Moreover, the defence industry needs to 
take data security into account at the design stage of 
any system architecture. It therefore stands to reason 
that manufacturers should be included in the further 
development and use of cyberdefence systems. How-
ever, this should be coordinated at the European level, 
approved by politically independent or parliamentary 
decisions, and remain committed to an exclusively 
defensive military logic. Otherwise, such conduct 
would run counter to due diligence and would also 
break with the tradition of military restraint in for-
eign and security policy. The required inclusiveness in 
all issues of international cyber policy and cybersecu-
rity policy also means that the German Federal Parlia-
ment must be duly involved. Should the German 
armed forces be empowered to use digital attacks as 
part of their cyberdefence, the political change of 
course that might be required for this would need to 
be debated in Parliament. A robust security policy pre-
supposes social resilience, which can only be created 
through public debate. This also includes carrying out 
a reality check on the parliamentary-approval require-
ment for cyber operations by the German armed forces. 
It will be the Parliament’s task to create effective struc-
tures for parliamentary oversight. 
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List of Abbreviations 
AA Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
BAAINBw Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, 
Information Technology and In-Service Support 
BBK Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance 
BfV Federal Office for the Protection of the Consti-
tution 
BKA Federal Criminal Police Office 
BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
BMI Federal Ministry of the Interior 
BMVg Federal Ministry of Defence 
BMVI Federal Ministry for Traffic and Digital Infra-
structure 
BMWi Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
BND Federal Intelligence Service 
BPol Federal Police 
BSI Federal Office of Information Security 
CAPS Child Abuse Prevention System 
CCDCOE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(NATO) 
CEF Connecting Europe Facility 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CERT-Bund Computer Emergency Response Team of the 
German Federal Administration 
CERTBw Computer Emergency Response Team of the 
German armed forces 
CIRK Cyberspace and information-space command 
CNA Computer network attacks 
CND Computer network defence 
CNE Computer network exploitation 
CNO Computer network operation 
COMPACT Civic Responsibilities, One Unfragmented Resource, 
Multistakeholder Approach to Promote Democracy 
and Human Rights, Sound Technological Archi-
tecture, Confidence and Transparent Governance 
CSBM Confidence- and security-building measures 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EGC European Government CERTs Group 
ENISA European Network and Information Security 
Agency 
EU European Union 
Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
Europol European Police Office 
FIRST Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams 
FoP Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 
GGE Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunica-
tions in the Context of International Security (UN) 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 
ICT Information and communication technology 
IGF Internet Governance Forum 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
IT Information technology 
IWWN International Watch and Warning Network 
KSA Kommando Strategische Aufklärung – strategic 
reconnaissance commando 
MAD Military Counterintelligence Service 
MLA mutual legal assistance agreement 
NIS Network and Information Security 
NIST National Institute of Standards (USA) 
NSA National Security Agency 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 
PKGr Parlamentary oversight committee 
PPP Public-Private Partnership 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SIT Strategic Initiative Technology 
SME Small and medium enterprises 
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
TA Signal intelligence 
TFTP Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UN United Nations 
UP KRITIS Implementation plan for (critical) infrastructure 
WEF World Economic Forum 
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society 
ZKA Customs Investigation Bureau 
